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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN, 
§78-2-2(3)(a)(2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly construed and applied relevant 
provisions of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act in holding the 
district court could extend the period for rejecting Mr. Matthews5 claim. (R. 1044-
1060, 2057-2075, 2140-2146). 
"We review the court of appeals' interpretation of the relevant statute for 
correctness, according no deference to its conclusions." Regal Ins, Co, v. Canal 
Ins, Co,, 2004 UT 50, f 5, 93 P.3d 99. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award 
of attorney fees and in imposing fees for the appeal. (R. 3010-3019). 
"Whether a claim is 'without merit' is a question of law and we review it 
for correctness." In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, f 45, 86 P.3d 712. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of the issues on appeal involves the interpretation of the 
following statutory provisions: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001): 
(1) A dissolved company in winding up may dispose of the known 
claims against it by following the procedures described in this section. 
(2) A company in winding up electing to dispose of known claims 
pursuant to this section may give written notice of the company's 
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dissolution to known claimants at any time after the effective date of 
dissolution. The written notice must: 
(a) describe the information that must be included in a claim; 
(b) provide an address 1o which written notice of any claim 
must be given to the company; 
(c) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days 
after the effective date of the notice, by which the dissolved company 
must receive the claim; and 
(d) state that, unless sooner barred by another state statute 
limiting actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the 
deadline. 
(3) Unless sooner barred by another statute limiting actions, a 
claim against the dissolved company is barred if: 
(a) a claimant was given notice under Subsection (2) and the 
claim is not received by the dissolved company by the deadline; or 
(b) the dissolved company delivers to the claimant written 
notice of rejection of the claim within 90 days after receipt of the 
claim and the claimant whose claim was rejected by the dissolved 
company does not commence a proceeding to enforce the claim 
within 90 days after the effective date of the rejection notice. 
(4) Claims which are not rejected by the dissolved company in 
writing within 90 days after receipt of the claim by the dissolved 
company shall be considered approved. 
(5) The failure of the dissolved company to give notice to any 
known claimant pursuant to Subsection (2) does not affect the 
disposition under this section of any claim held by any other known 
claimant. 
(6) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a 
contingent liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the 
effective date of dissolution. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56(1) (1988): 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith[.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In January of 2002 a petition for judicial dissolution of Olympus 
Construction, L.C. ("Olympus") was filed. (R. 1-6). Initially a custodian was 
appointed for Olympus. (R. 504-506). On August 21, 2002, a Decree of Judicial 
Dissolution of Olympus was entered and the custodian was converted to a receiver 
for the purpose of winding up the business and affairs of Olympus. (R. 589-591). 
On May 6, 2003, Annette Jarvis was appointed as the successor receiver for 
Olympus and continues to act as its receiver today. (R. 771-778). 
On December 2, 2003, Olympus filed a Motion for Declaratory Relief to 
Establish a Claim Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure (the "Claim Bar Date 
Motion"), and a Memorandum in support thereof (the "Claim Bar Date 
Memorandum") (copies of which are attached hereto as Addendum E for ease of 
reference). (R. 791-835). On February 26, 2004, the district court entered an order 
pursuant to the Claim Bar Date Motion setting June 30, 2004 as the date by which 
written notice of claims must be submitted pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
1305 (2001), or be forever barred as set forth in the statute. (R. 843-863). 
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On June 30, 2004, David C. Matthews timely filed a Notice of Claim 
asserting he was entitled to payment of a $100,000 commission arising from the 
previous purchase of real property in Summit County, Utah by Olympus. (R. 968). 
The 90-day period to reject timely filed claims as set forth in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) expired on September 28, 2004, without Olympus 
rejecting Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim. 
On November 10, 2004, Olympus filed a motion requesting permission to 
repay loans to members of Olympus. (R. 988-995). Mr. Matthews opposed that 
motion, arguing that UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308 (2001) requires payment to 
third party creditors prior to any payments to owners in a dissolution proceeding, 
and therefore his claim should be paid first as an approved claim pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). (R. 996-1002). 
On November 18, 2004, Olympus filed a motion requesting that a future date 
be set as a deadline by which Olympus would still be able to reject timely filed 
claims. (R. 1021-1038). Mr. Matthews opposed that motion on the grounds that the 
statutory deadline for Olympus to reject timely filed claims had already expired as 
set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c« 1305(4) (2001), and Mr. Matthews filed a 
motion requesting that Olympus pay his claim as an approved claim. (R. 1044-
1060). The district court rejected Mr. Matthews' argument that his claim should be 
paid as an approved claim, and a future date was set by which Olympus was 
required to reject timely filed claims. (R. 2085-2091, 2140-2146). 
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Olympus subsequently rejected Mr. Matthews' claim on April 14, 2005, 
which was within the extended time period established by the district court. (R. 
2147-2156). Pursuant to the procedure established by the district court, Mr. 
Matthews filed a Claim Response on April 15, 2005 (R. 2187-2189) and an 
Amended Claim Response on May 12, 2005 (R. 2246-2259) to pursue his claim. 
On December 20, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Olympus as to Mr. Matthews' claim on the grounds that such claim was 
barred by the Utah broker licensing statutes and statute of frauds. (R. 3037-3039). 
On July 12, 2006, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to the effect that Olympus was entitled to an award of attorney fees from Mr. 
Matthews pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988) on the grounds that Mr. 
Matthews' pursuit of his claim was without merit, in bad faith, and for purposes of 
delay. (R. 3119-3137). On July 20, 2006, the district court entered an order setting 
the amount of attorney fees to be paid by Mr. Matthews. (R. 3155-3286). 
This appeal was commenced on August 9, 2006. (R. 3320-3321). 
In a written opinion filed on November 8, 2007, the court of appeals 
affirmed the district court's grant of an extension of time to Olympus to reject Mr. 
Matthews' timely filed claim, affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Olympus on the merits of Mr. Matthews' claim, affirmed the 
district court's grant of attorney fees to Olympus, and awarded attorney fees on 
appeal. Matthews v. Olympus Construction, LC, 2007 UT App 361, 173 P.3d 192. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times relevant to the real estate commission that is the subject of Mr. 
Matthews' claim, he was properly licensed in the State of Utah as a real estate agent 
and was affiliated with Fred B. Law of Re-Max Brokers, L.C. as his supervising 
principal broker. (R. 2946-2948, 3111-3112). 
In June of 1998, Olympus retained the services of Mr. Matthews and Re-
Max Brokers, L.C. in relation to the acquisition of a parcel of property in Summit 
County, Utah by Olympus. A Real Estate Purchase Contract for that purchase was 
entered into on August 26, 1998, with a purchase price of $3,000,000 (R.2685-
2696), and the purchase closed on December 3, 1998 (R. 2702-2703). At the 
closing, Re-Max Brokers, L.C. Was paid a nominal commission for its services in 
the amount of $200. (R. 2703-2704). It was agreed that Olympus would pay Re-
Max Brokers, L.C. a $100,000 commission in compensation for its services in 
assisting Olympus to acquire the property, but, in light of Olympus' limited cash 
flow at the time of purchase, that commission was deferred and payable when 
Olympus sold the property. (R. 2883-2884). The property was not sold until the 
latter part of 2003 as part of the judicial dissolution proceedings. (R. 779-790). 
In 1999, Mr. Matthews and his wife Jane (who had previously acted as an 
associate broker for Re-Max Brokers, L.C), terminated their business relationship 
with Fred B. Law as their supervising principal broker, and Jane Matthews became 
licensed as a principal broker. At that time, Mr. Law assigned to Jane Matthews his 
right to collect the $100,000 commission from Olympus. (R. 2946-2948). Jane 
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Matthews subsequently assigned to Mr. Matthews her right to collect the $100,000 
commission from Olympus. (R. 2942-2944, 2946-2948, 3111-3112). This 
$100,000 commission is the subject of Mr. Matthews' claim. (R. 968). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Olympus purposely availed itself of the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-2c-1305 (2001) to dispose of known claims by third party creditors. The plain 
language of § 48-2c-1305(4) states that if Olympus does not reject Mr. Matthews5 
timely filed claim within 90 days of receipt thereof then Mr. Matthews' claim shall 
be considered approved. By failing to reject Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim 
within the 90-day rejection period mandated by statute, Olympus has irrevocably 
approved Mr. Matthews' claim and should be required to pay the same without 
further inquiry. The district court does not have the equitable power to alter the 
statutorily mandated deadline for the rejection of claims. 
An award of attorney fees is not warranted under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-
56 (1998) because Mr. Matthews' claim had merit notwithstanding the adverse 
rulings by the district court and the court of appeals. Mr. Matthews' arguments 
were based on the plain language of controlling statutes and/or the statutes at issue 
were reasonably susceptible to the interpretation advanced by Mr. Matthews. No 
Utah appellate court has directly addressed an assignment of a properly earned 
commission by a broker solely for purposes of collection. In short, Mr. Matthews' 
claim and other arguments were based in law and fact, albeit they were 
unsuccessful. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING AND 
APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) 
(2001) AND AFFIRMING THE EXTENSION OF THE STATUTORY 
DEADLINE FOR OLYMPUS TO REJECT TIMELY FILED CLAIMS. 
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Olympus, the court of appeals rejected Mr. Matthews5 argument that his claim 
should have been deemed approved—because Olympus did not reject it in writing 
within the period required by statute—and thus should have been paid. As 
explained below, that was error. 
A. Olympus and the district court relied upon and followed the 
procedure set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) in 
order to address known claims against Olympus. 
The genesis of these legal proceedings is a judicial dissolution proceeding 
pursuant to the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (Chapter 2c of Title 
48 of the Utah Code) whereby Olympus was dissolved and its business affairs 
woundup. (R. 1-6). UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1213(2) (2001), which expressly 
addresses a judicial decree of dissolution, states: 
After entering the decree of dissolution, the court shall direct the 
winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in 
accordance with Part 13. 
Accordingly, it does not matter if the dissolution proceedings are pursuant to 
a judicial dissolution or a non-judicial dissolution, the winding up of the dissolved 
company's business and affairs is governed by Part 13, which includes UTAH CODE 
ANN.§48-2c-1305. 
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As part of the judicial dissolution proceedings herein, the district court 
appointed a receiver to wind up the affairs of Olympus. Notably, nowhere in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1212 (2001), which authorizes the district court to appoint a 
receiver for a dissolved company in a judicial dissolution proceeding, is there any 
suggestion that the district court may alter the statutory procedures and deadlines 
otherwise in force with respect to dissolution of the company. In fact, Paragraph 4 
of the Successor Receiver Order entered on May 6, 2003, which appoints Annette 
Jarvis as the successor receiver in place of Alan Funk, states (emphasis added): 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of 
known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or 
publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may 
accept or reject claims all as provided in Utah Code Ann, § 48-2c-
1305 and 1306. 
(R. 773). 
It is noteworthy that the May 6, 2003 Successor Receiver Order only 
referenced the setting of dates for the barring of claims, and further referenced the 
fact that the claims would be accepted or rejected as provided by statute. No 
provision was made for Olympus to come back to the district court at some arbitrary 
time in the future to set a date by which Olympus must reject timely claims. This is 
consistent with the referenced statutes in that a date has to be established as a 
deadline for the submission of claims, but once the claim bar date has been set the 
acceptance or rejection of claims is governed by the referenced statutes and the time 
periods set forth therein. 
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Subsequently, Olympus expressly relied upon the language from the May 6, 
2003 Successor Receiver Order quoted above and the provisions of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c~1305 (2001) in filing the Claim Bar Date Motion and Claim Bar Date 
Memorandum on or about December 2, 2003. (R. 791-794). In fact, the Claim Bar 
Date Motion specifically states on pages 1 and 2 thereof (emphasis in original): 
This motion is being filed pursuant to the language of the Stipulated 
Order Approving Successor Receiver which provides in paragraph 4 
as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may 
dispose of known and unknown claims against Olympus by 
notice and/or publication, may set dates for the barring of 
such claims and may accept or reject claims all as provided 
in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306. 
(R. 701-702). The Claim Bar Date Motion further specifically requests on page 2 
that the district court enter an order (emphasis added): 
Establishing April 15, 2004, as the bar date for all claims to be filed 
against Olympus' receivership estate, or as soon thereafter to comply 
with the 120 day notice requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-
2c-l305(2), and further ordering that to the extent creditor claims are 
not timely filed, they will be forever barred[.] 
(R. 702). 
The above language from the Successor Receiver Order is also quoted on 
page 2 of the Claim Bar Date Memorandum with the same language highlighted 
therein. (R. 796). The Claim Bar Date Memorandum also reiterates multiple times 
throughout (pages 6, 8 and 12) the request that April 15, 2004 be established as the 
claim bar date, "or as soon thereafter to comply with the 120 day notice requirement 
set forth in Utah Code § 48-2c-1305(2)." (R. 799; 802; 806). 
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The Claim Bar Date Memorandum further states on page 6 (emphasis 
added): 
The Receiver asserts that the proposed Notice of Deadline contains all 
of the necessary notices and information regarding how, when and 
where potential creditors must file their claims against Olympus' 
receivership estate as required by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305. 
(R. 800). The Claim Bar Date Memorandum then proceeds to set forth the 
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(2) (2001) verbatim on page 6 thereof. 
(R. 800). The Claim Bar Date Memorandum concludes by stating on page 12 
(emphasis added): 
Finally, the Receiver further moves that all creditors be required to 
send a copy of their Notice of Claim, along with copies of all 
supporting documents sufficient to the Receiver. The supporting 
documents will enable to Receiver to evaluate the claims and 
determine whether they should be allowed or objected to." 
(R. 806). 
The above statement is consistent with the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) to the effect that once a claim has been timely filed prior to 
the claim bar date, "[c]laims which are not rejected by the dissolved company 
within 90 days after receipt of the claim by the dissolved company shall be 
considered approved." In other words, the supporting documents filed with the 
Notice of Claim will enable Olympus to evaluate whether timely filed claims should 
be rejected (within the 90 day statutory period) or allowed ( either affirmatively 
acknowledged by Olympus or deemed approved per statute). 
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B, The plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) 
mandates that Olympus reject timely filed claims within 90 days 
of receipt or such claims shall be considered approved. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) sets forth a very specific procedure 
for addressing and disposing of known claims against a dissolved company. First, 
the dissolved company gives "written notice of the company's dissolution to known 
claimants/' which explains that a known claim must be submitted in writing to the 
company by a specified date or, "unless sooner barred by another state statute 
limiting actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline." § 48-2c-
1305(2). The written notice must also "describe the information that must be 
included in a claim" and "provide an address to which written notice of any claim 
must be given to the company." Id. If a written claim is not submitted to the 
company on or before the deadline set forth in the written notice, then the claimant 
is forever barred from pursuing the claim against the dissolved company. § 48-2c-
1305(3). 
If "the dissolved company delivers to the claimant written notice of rejection 
of the claim within 90 days after receipt of the claim," the claimant is then required 
"to commence a proceeding to enforce the claim within 90 days after the effective 
date of the rejection notice" or once again the claimant will be forever barred from 
pursuing the claim against the dissolved company. Id. However, "[c]laims which 
are not rejected by the dissolved company in writing within 90 days after receipt of 
the claim by the dissolved company shall be considered approved." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). 
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It is undisputed that Mr. Matthews timely filed a written Notice of Claim 
against Olympus on June 30, 2004. (R. 844; 968). Ninety days from the date of 
Olympus' receipt of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim was September 28,2004. 
However, Olympus did not reject Mr. Matthews' claim in writing until April 14, 
2005, nine-and-a-half months after he filed it, and well outside of the 90-day 
rejection period plainly prescribed by statute. (R. 2147-2156). 
The question is whether the court of appeals correctly construed UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) when it rejected Mr. Matthews' contention that his 
claim should have been deemed approved based on Olympus' failure to reject the 
claim within the statutory period. "'In construing any statute, [this court] 
examine[s] the statute's plain language and resort[s] to other methods of statutory 
interpretation[ ] only if the language is ambiguous. Accordingly, [the court] read[s] 
the words of a statute literally . . . and give[s] the words their usual and accepted 
meaning.'" Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Mack, Inc., 2001 UT App 341, f^ 9, 
37 P.3d 267 (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 2000 UT App 372, 
If 9, 21 P.3d 231 (internal quotations omitted)). "In so doing, [the court] 6assume[s] 
that each term was used advisedly by the legislature.'" Id (quoting Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875. "When interpreting a 
statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal 'is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.'" 
Id, % 11 (quoting Biddle, 1999 UT 110, Tf 13 (internal quotations omitted)). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) is identical to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 16-10a-1406 (1992) (which deals with the disposition of known claims by a 
dissolved corporation). However, the interpretation and application of these statutes 
has not been the subject of any reported opinion in Utah prior to this case. 
These Utah statutory provisions are somewhat unique in that there does not 
appear to be any provision in any other state code that is similar to subsection (4) 
requiring that timely filed claims be rejected in writing within 90 days of 
submission thereof or such claims shall be deemed to have been approved. Even 
the model acts on which UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-1406 (1992) and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) are based do not contain a provision similar to 
subsection (4) of these two Utah Code sections, but rather they are silent as to the 
deadline for a claim to be rejected and the effect of any failure to timely reject a 
claim. MODEL REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 14.06 (1984); UNIFORM 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 807 (1996). (Copies of which are attached 
hereto as Addendum F.) 
However, it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute 
in order to ascertain the meaning and application of the term "shall be considered 
approved." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines "considered" to mean 
"[d]eemed; determined; adjudged." In reading these words literally, and giving 
them their usual and accepted meaning, particularly within the context in which 
these words are used in the statute, Mr. Matthews' claim should have been 
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considered approved, or deemed approved, or determined approved, or adjudged 
approved, and should have been paid without any further inquiry. 
The fact that the claim is "considered approved" simply distinguishes this set 
of circumstances from a situation in which a dissolved company affirmatively 
accepts or admits the company's obligation to pay a claim. Rather than the claim 
being approved pursuant to the affirmative act of the company, the claim is 
"considered approved" or deemed approved as a matter of law because the company 
failed to reject the claim in writing within the statutorily prescribed time limit. The 
end result in both situations is the same: the claim must be paid. This result is 
consistent with the apparent purpose that the statute was meant to achieve—an 
efficient method for addressing and disposing of known claims by a dissolved 
company to bring about finality to the company's business and affairs—as 
highlighted by the fact that the Utah State Legislature intentionally inserted a 
unique clause into the statute by requiring rejection of timely filed claims within 90 
days of receipt by the dissolved company. 
C. The district court did not have the authority to extend the 
statutory deadline to reject timely filed claims, especially after 
such deadline had already expired. 
The court of appeals concluded "that the trial court had the power to extend 
the time for rejecting claims and that Matthews's claims were properly rejected." 
Matthews v. Olympus Construction, LC, 2007 UT App 361, f 18, 173 P.3d 192. 
The court of appeals came to this conclusion by reasoning that Part 12 of the Utah 
Revised Limited Liability Company Act governing dissolutions permits the judge 
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overseeing the dissolution to "appoint a receiver . . . with all powers and duties the 
court directs/' with the court having "exclusive jurisdiction over the company and 
all of its property/' and that the "court shall describe the powers and duties of the 
receiver . . . in its appointing order, which may be amended from time to time." Id. 
at f 16. The court of appeals then went on to quote the May 6, 2003 Successor 
Receiver Order to the effect that the receiver's "powers may be specifically 
circumscribed or expanded by the terms of this order or any subsequent Order of the 
Court" and that "[njothing in this Order shall prevent the Receiver from requesting 
augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers as Receiver to the 
full extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to the [c]ourt and 
after notice and a hearing." Id. at Tf 17. 
In other words, the court of appeals concluded that because the district court 
had the ability to describe the scope of the authority of the receiver, which authority 
may be modified from time to time, then the district court had the ability to grant 
the receiver the authority to reject timely filed claims even after the statutory 
deadline to reject timely filed claims had expired. 
The court of appeals' reasoning is troubling because it ignores the plain 
language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001), especially in the context of 
Parts 12 and 13 of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act as a whole, and 
assumes that the authority of a receiver includes the ability to alter statutory 
deadlines by which Olympus as a dissolved company is otherwise bound. 
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• Noneoftherele\ ant statutes shoi Udbe Iiite i: preted and applied in a \ aci 11 im, 
bi it rather they shoi lid be taken in context and interpreted and applied in a manner 
that harmonizes and gives effect M all statutory provisions. As set forth above, • 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-121 3(2 ) < , i::t n ll) expressly states that in the context i i ; t 
ji idicial dissoli ition :'the coi irt shall direct the v " H:,"» « fm > * md liauidation of the 
company's business and affairs in accordance with Part H ' • '--ile UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1212 (2001) allows a court to prescribe Luc uuliioruy oi ,* uxciwr. ii 
is a leap of logic to conch ide (lint \m smhiny the niilhonh nf ;i irnrivt r includes the 
ability to alter statutory deadlines by which the dissolved company is otherwise 
bound. There is a distinct difference between the authoi -A\ oi a receiver to act on 
t . • :•• - ; -e jsoh ed 
company. The requirement that the dissolved comnam »viect timely filed claims 
within 90 days of receipt thereof is a statutory deadline h\ which the di^ soKv,, 
claim on behalf of the dissolved company). While a receiver may have the 
authority to reject a timely filed claim on behalf of a dissolved company (or to 
c1 . - '- - f i : , • • . • v l • 
company), such authority cannot \itiate the general obligation uf the dissolved 
company to reject claims within the statutorily mandated time period (or to pursue a 
limitations). 
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The Utah State Legislature intentionally inserted a unique provision in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) that requires a dissolved company to reject 
timely filed claims within 90 days of receipt thereof or such claims shall be deemed 
to be approved. In light of the overall framework of Parts 12 and 13 of the Utah 
Revised Limited Liability Company Act as a whole, and the specific language of 
§ 48-2c-1305(4), when it comes to dealing with known claims against a dissolved 
company there is no basis for concluding that the Utah State Legislature intended to 
treat judicial dissolutions differently than non-judicial dissolutions, or intended to 
provide dissolved companies acting through receivers with an advantage over 
dissolved companies winding up without receivers. 
Any dissolved company that elects to afford itself of the claim bar benefits 
available by following the procedures set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001) is bound by the provisions thereof regardless of whether such dissolution 
occurs non-judicially or judicially, with or without a receiver. To hold otherwise 
would frustrate the plain intent of this statute and render meaningless the unique 
provision intentionally inserted by the Utah State Legislature. 
D. Summary, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) makes it clear that the procedure set 
forth therein has the same effect as a statute of limitations, and if a claim is not 
timely submitted to the dissolved company then the claim is forever barred without 
the need for any further inquiry as to the merits of the claim. The limiting nature of 
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§48-Jc-l)(l niiilaiiih igamsl di nhcd loiiipamt * uil both ua\ II the 
dissoh cd i ompam thxN not irfec t in willing a limely tiled claim within 90 days 
after the dissolved company's receipt ol that claim, then the dissolved compan\ is 
forever banul lioni disputing the claim further and the claim i consideted 
appiinnl line In Ih Ihi tfiSMih i d » onipain *in*l the i I mnant lie HI equal looting 
and control their own destinies with icspect to their abilil\ to pursue or defend 
against a claim II the claimant mioses the deadline to tile the claim, the claim is 
bailed, illln li I » d t onipain mis>cs tin* deadline to H \ei 1 the* laini the 11 nil i 
approved and should be paid 11 both the claimant and the dissoh ed companv 
comply with the statutory deadlines, then the claimant still has an opportunity to 
assi il i(s * 1 inn in i h «> il pincei dim* and lh< ili^oh * <l < umpan\ still has an 
opportunity to defend against that claim. 
It would be manifestly unjust, and contrary to the plain language of the 
si all it to ill m i >h nip il«. to In CM used lioni it « 1 n I n line In icp it Mi 
Matthews' timely filed claim w itlim 90 da\ s alter its receipt thereof, especially 
when Mr. Matthews' claim indisputably would have been lorevei barred had lie 
failul t > hmeh lili Indium Unit niiotqinPi in n I ii Mill iidiioica^on 
why a dissolved company under the eontiol of a receive? (because the principals 
thereof are not capable of winding up the ai lairs ol the dissoh ed company) should 
ha\eMuh i inniiiiment il (Uhanlau »M i It oh cd t nmpaim ^ \\ 1i< tie ibli h \md 
up their affairs without the assistance oi a leceiver. 
/<; -
While Olympus may not have been bound to dispose of known claims 
pursuant to the procedure set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001), once 
Olympus elected to take advantage of the claim barring aspects of that statute then 
Olympus was bound to reject timely filed claims within the prescribed statutory 
period. There is simply no legal or equitable basis that justifies allowing Olympus 
to pick and choose what aspects of § 48-2c-1305 by which it is or is not bound. 
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that it was appropriate for the district 
court to extend the statutorily prescribed time period within which Olympus was 
required to reject timely filed claims, then similar to the manner in which extensions 
of other deadlines prescribed by statute or rule are typically made, such an 
extension should have been addressed prior to the expiration of the subject deadline 
rather than then allowing Olympus to decide in its sole and absolute discretion 
when it would decide to finally address third party claims (rather than trying to 
obtain approval for payments to owners in advance of payments to third party 
creditors contrary to statute). 
In short, the court of appeals erred in failing to interpret and apply the plain 
language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) to the failure of Olympus to 
timely reject Mr. Matthews' claim in writing as mandated by statute. Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's 
judgment in favor of Olympus and remand with directions to the district court to 
enter an order requiring Olympus to pay the full amount of Mr. Matthews' timely 
filed claim as an approved claim. 
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If this Court grants the relief requested abo\ e, the award of attorney fetus in 
f< s \ :* o- • - !" - wr^vd hvmise Ohnm *!•; i-a longer be the 
prevailing party \\\ hov. c\ei\ this (\)urt (iocs not urani Uuu relief, the court of 
appeals ---for the reasons set iorlh heiow still erred in „ -1inning tiw aistnct c iirt s 
award of attorney fees and awarding additional attorney fees on appeal •• • 
H. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND IN 
IMPOSING FEES ON APPEAL. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (relating to ;m inadvertent mistake in an affidavit as 
to the identity of the principal broker at the time the -u »--cct commission was 
earned, w hichmista* • »• hiicr > ..-»•-.•<.,* - ::M;^ • *•-* • - •
 : \ ^ 
meaningful effect upon the substanlhe arguments on the merits of Mr. Matthews' 
claim), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1 988) (because the district court 
c o n c l u d e d IS I f J : • ;. - - - •• ••**-: • *\% ^ • 
3122-3137, 3155-3286). However, in none of its orders or findings does the district 
court make any distinction as to the amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to 
delay occasioned by the offending affidavit, and no such delay actually occurred) 
and the amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to I IlAl I CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 
(1988). 
• In affirming the district court's award of attorney fees and awarding fees on 
appeal, the court r-f appeals o:ii\ references UTAH Con* ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Matthews v. Olympus Construction, LC, 2007 UT App 361, fflf 23 & 27, 173 P.3d 
192. 
In most every judicial proceeding, one party will prevail over the other to 
some extent. However, the mere fact that a court rejects a claim made by a 
particular party in a judicial proceeding does not automatically entitle the prevailing 
party to an award of attorney fees absent either a contractual provision expressly 
authorizing an attorney fee award or a statutory provision authorizing an attorney 
fee award based upon very specific facts and circumstances. Watkiss & Campbell 
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). 
A. Standard applicable to an award of attorney fees. 
Notwithstanding the adverse outcomes for Mr. Matthews in the district court 
and the court of appeals, all of his arguments had merit for purposes of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
"Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code is narrowly drawn and 'not meant to be 
applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits.'" In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 
If 46, 86 P.3d 712 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). 
"To safeguard against an overly broad application, a prevailing party must 
demonstrate two distinct elements before a court may award attorney fees; namely, 
that the claims is (1) without merit, and (2) not brought or asserted in good faith." 
Id 
"A claim is without merit if it is ' of little weight or importance having no 
basis in law or fact.5" Id at 147 (quoting Cady, 671 P.2d at 151). 
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B. Mi\ Matthews' claim and other arguments have merit. 
As set forth at length above, Mr. Matthews' argument that his claim should 
be paid as an approved claim,, under I JTAH C O D E A N N . § 48-2c-13c* * (2uo I) because 
merit, i.e., such an argument cannot be characterized as having little weight or 
importance having no basis in lav. or Cat. "Regardless of the ultimate outcome of 
this case. \»;. *\M--- •• •,.:-: H * : . r .-. ^ .• ix^- ••';! os. v aiL-ii>:ci.: *IM.. 
upon the plain language of a unique statute "that had never been interpreted in any 
reported court decision. TfMich arguments arc classified as ecv ilhout merit" for 
purposes of awarding auorne> lees under 1 ; \ *;tM>: / , i -:- s ::_i: 
s-• ' • . * . " • • - rhiHinp tTfecw •• »N'-'c !h \ vitimale auvouiey foi the 
initial interpretation o\\\ statute by a court. 
2. Assignment of commission argument has merit 
Matthews* claim for a commission w:\± without merit because Mr. MnUhews 
was not a licensed pnnupul broker as r eq in id c,\ i • s o .. v * ;Di. AN *. J - ; J -
18 (1985) I low e * er, ther e is no * r< ^  mii n * < ikiirii! t *; 1 1 \\ M 1 1 « i. snl VK *;c r i < *<: mv. i ns«i< vti 
was initially earned and payable to i red B. Law, a^ the nroperly licero _• 1 
principal broker with whom Mr. M.i;ihevvs was alWluxWd at ihe lime llnough 
Re-Max Brokers, I ( ' 11 id Mr I :m been On/ claimant MI ihb, niaHer, there 
would not be an issue invoiv ing the Utah broker licensing statutes. The issue 
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thus becomes whether a commission once properly earned and payable to a 
licensed principal broker can subsequently be assigned to a non-broker for 
purposes of collection, which is an issue of first impression for Utah 
appellate courts. 
Notwithstanding the conclusionary statements made by the district 
court and the court of appeals to the contrary, as discussed more fully below 
no reported Utah opinion directly addresses whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-
2-18 (1985) prohibits the assignment of a principal broker's right to collect a 
commission after the commission has been earned. 
In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), an agent sought 
collection of a commission in his capacity as an agent in light of the fact that 
the licensed principal broker with whom the agent purported to be affiliated 
took no responsibility for the acts of the agent and the agent acted 
completely independent of the principal broker contrary to the intent and 
purpose of the licensing statutes. No allegation was even made that an 
assignment of the right to collect the commission was made by the principal 
broker to the agent after the commission had been properly earned under the 
supervision of the licensed principal broker. 
In Morris vs. John Price Assocs., Inc., 590 P.2d 315 (Utah 1979), a 
lawsuit to collect a commission was brought in the names of both the 
principal broker and the agent; while the judgment in favor of the agent was 
vacated, the judgment in favor of the broker was affirmed. Again, noticeably 
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absent was any purported assignment from the broke i: to the agent of the 
ri^ *' * - • ttherthe bvoV/r--v..-iu c(sH c^i«iMi inthe.-
broker's own name. 
In both Diversijieti u'u/. ('',//>. v\ •l/n/i /A^Z/CM/M ( «>&/.>«., /„v.. •• 
P . . 2 d > - - i " ' - l - f • ^ > . V. • •-. <'\ "\' 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), there simply was no licensed principal broker involved 
in the transaction and the unlicensed individual seeking collection of a 
While there is no Utah case law specifically addressing an assignment of a 
principal broker's right to collect a commission under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-18 
(1985), the established I J \\\- . .. - M L M r u J \ • \ : . C ? K •
 4 * .. . .:]n assignment 
of an interest in a contract gives the assignee the same rights as die assignor." West 
One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 887 P.2d 880. n3 M p. 883 (Utah Ct.' 
i\,
 l , ^uoun^.A.'. v i>. i w' . . : 
1988)). In other words, the assignee stands in the same shoes as the assignor, and 
has the same rights as the assignor. Accordingly, Mr. Matthews asserted that as an 
assignee of I\ !i I -aw ' 's right to collect the commission, 'I ti , Matthew s stands in the 
same shoes as Mr. Law and should be allowed to collect the commission. 
The Utah cases discussed ulnnc are consistent with the decisions of other 
courts faced with simiKu icai cvtaiu licensing , , J I U ; ^ L, ., .:.:\. .\j:iey ;_, 
recognized the right of an assignee to si le and assert the same rights as the assiiinine 
real estate broker. For example, Section 4735.21 of the * )hio Revised Code states: 
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"No right of action shall accrue to any person, partnership, association or 
corporation for the performance of the acts mentioned in section 4735.01 of the 
Revised Code, without alleging and proving that such person, partnership, 
association or corporation was licensed as a real estate broker . . . . " In Ritchie v. 
Weston, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), the Ohio Court of Appeals 
upheld the right of a real estate agent to sue for a commission based upon an 
assignment of the commission to the agent from the principal broker. In issuing its 
ruling, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that an assignee "stands in the shoes of 
the assignor.55 Id. at 837. The court further reasoned: 
Standing in the shoes of another means that the assignee stands in the 
shoes of the assignor or subrogor and succeeds to all the rights and 
remedies of the latter. There is no question that Grubb & Ellis is a 
licensed broker and had the right to bring this action, so the 
prerequisites of R.C. 4735.21 had been satisfied. As assignee, Ritchie 
therefore held the same right to bring the cause of action as Grubb & 
Ellis. 
Id. 
Similarly, in Hodge v. Kun, 868 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "[u]nder Arizona law, a licensed real estate 
salesman who has been assigned his broker's right to a commission arguably is 
entitled to sue the principal directly for the commission." 
Utah courts have expressly addressed the intent of the broker licensing 
statutes. The Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
It is apparent that the [broker licensing] statutes were enacted . . . to 
provide for registration and regulation of those engaged in the real 
estate business.... In Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8 Cal. App. 2d 634, 48 
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K-U MM, P.- . . j u . d c c c ia i i biuieu: "Thepriiiiiii'} pmpo>c oi die Real 
Estate Brokers Act was to require real estate bro!.ei< an<! ^nle^^en to 
be 'honest, truthful :md of qood reputa t ion /" 
Andersen v Johnson. 1M* P.2d 725. '727 ij Itali 1945). T; \
 v occurring opinion, 
Justice Wade oI iiu. I i ;^ supreme ( V a n expressl) staled: 
A reading o; ihe .salutes iv.i ; a h * >. ai eaUUv- br- *. ' \ ik; - ii 
apparent they were enacku ;'. u . . vnclit of the > -/<\k ^ j^otect 
them from dishonest and unscrupulous real estate agents. 
Id. at 730 (quoted with approval m t ^vasijied Gt.,/. ( «</;". \ n>;<u bum i >»J) 
O w r a / , i //c , ^X-l I1 ,""(1 MIX. Xsi«Jf » l78). ." . • •;' 
As long as a commission is fully earned and payable to a licensed principal 
broker, then the purpose and intent of the broker licensing statutes—the protection 
commission that has been assigned to an individual who is not licensed as a 
principal broker is not contrary to the spirit and intent of the licensing statutes. 
who is not licensed as a contractor to collect payment for services that can only be 
performed by a licensed contractor notwithstanding U T A I I CODE ANN. § 58-55-604 
compensation for services requiring a contractor 's license by anyone who is not 
properly licensed, as long as it can be proven that the purpose of the licensing 
statute—the protection c f the public has been satisfied See, e,g, i K & R •, • 
Whipple Plumb. & Heat v. Aspen Constr., 199 UT App 86, ffli 14-2! . 977 P.2d 518. 
i j . 
The bottom line is that Mr. Matthews' argument that he was entitled to 
collect the subject commission (a) was consistent with established Utah law on 
assignments in general, (b) was consistent with case law from other jurisdictions 
with similar broker licensing statutes, (c) was not contrary to the spirit and intent of 
the Utah broker licensing statutes, (d) was consistent with the established Utah 
judicial exception for collection of compensation by an unlicensed contractor if it 
can be proven that the purpose of the licensing statute—the protection of the 
public—has been satisfied, and (e) presented an issue of first impression for Utah 
appellate courts. Mr. Matthews' arguments do have a substantial basis in law and 
fact. If such arguments are classified as "without merit" for purposes of awarding 
attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988), then such a decision will 
have a chilling effect on legitimate advocacy with respect to matters of first 
impression when first addressed by a Utah court notwithstanding favorable rulings 
from other jurisdictions with similar statutes. 
3. Statute of frauds argument has merit 
There is no genuine dispute that a brokerage relationship between Olympus 
on the one hand, and Re-Max Brokers, L.C. and Mr. Matthews on the other hand, 
was memorialized in writing as required by the statute of frauds. Indeed, even 
Olympus has essentially conceded that "the REPC, Commission Check, and 
Settlement Statement indicate only that Mathews, through his brokerage, Re-Max, 
was to be paid (and was paid) a total of $200.00 in 'Sales/Broker's Commission.'" 
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Memoranda nun i,;*\\ i.- Nippon ;M ACUIIC: • ••?• i = • . \ ^n::u..av .»• up.:---* ; 
Disallow t1' .-::. .^\>u\ . s '!i!ir\\s !. .; '. : ; ^0(w :• L ^••5-0. 
However, ihe crux of Mr. Maiihews" claim .md Uv statute of frauds defense 
asserted by Olympus i :> •• hat there was an oral modi l ieai • v -, i ol IJK r•• okerage 
Matthews and his principal broker an additional $100,000 commission related to 
Olympus' acquisition of the subject property, however that comm.issi.on was to be 
commission was not referenced in the Settlement Statement). Hven though the 
promise to pay the SI 00,000 commission was not reduced to writing, a well-
ed. o\ - !'.\i v\ci.r- - • . i «• . \')v\ . • i.* »d'-* !! *< ll 
modification of the brokerage agreement. ;. 
The statute of frauds "is not to prevent the performance or the enforcement 
of oral contracts'that ha \ e in fact bee nmade; it is not to create alooDhole of escape 
for dishonest repudiators." English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 i\2d b 13, 616 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts § 498 (1.950)). 
The statute <M" Htm^ i> a ucieuse lhat can be Vs^w^d n\ a failure u > 
plead it as an allIiinative defense, admitting its existence in the 
' pleadings, or admitting at trial the existence and all essential terms of 
the contract. Since a purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent 
fraud and perjury on the part of one claiming that another had [entered 
into the subject transaction] . , .
 ? the one opposing the claim cannot 
complain if he admits the existence of the [subject transaction] . . . . 
"It cannot give a court any great satisfaction to permit a defendant to 
escape from performing a contract he admits he has made." 
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LP. Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Corbin on 
Contracts § 320 at 153 (1950)) (other numerous citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Olympus, by and through Richard Jaffa (an agent of Olympus that conducted 
virtually all of Olympus' business dealings at the time), promised to pay Mr. 
Matthews and his principal broker the $100,000 commission on a deferred basis as 
an incentive for Mr. Matthews and his principal broker to assist Olympus in 
purchasing the subject property. This obligation has subsequently been admitted 
numerous times in front of multiple third-parties such that "there is no serious 
possibility that the assertion of the [$100,000 commission]... is false" and 
enforcement of such agreement as demonstrated by the various documents and "as 
supplemented by the oral agreement [regarding the $100,000 commission i s ] . . . not 
barred by the statute of frauds." English, 814 P.2d at 617. 
A sworn affidavit of Mr. Matthews has been filed herein in which he fully 
explains the circumstances surrounding this oral promise on behalf of Olympus and 
the subsequent admissions of such obligation to numerous third parties. Affidavit 
of David C.Matthews, dated August 9, 2005. (R. 2858; 2884-2885). Notably, no 
affidavit signed under oath by Richard Jaffa has been filed in which he denies that 
such a promise and subsequent admissions occurred, and Olympus has otherwise 
never denied such an oral promise was made by Mr. Jaffa on behalf of Olympus 
(but rather Olympus has relied upon the statute of frauds and questioned Mr. Jaffa's 
authority to make such a promise that would be binding on Olympus). 
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Most notably , IVIi 1\ latthew s" claim was disposed of on si immai ) ji ldgment, 
and Mr, Matthews has been denied the opportunity to question Mr. Jaffa under oath 
at trial in order to elicit the admission at trial exception to the statute of frauds. 
In JM;/1(1 . .•,,• <M :ur tiWrh ^ ,\ *sun . *. > ;. Burgess, 810 P.2d 4 76 ( I ) tali 
Ct, \ pp. 1991 )5 the primary case relied I iponby the coi it: t of appeals in finding that 
Mr. Matthews' argument concerning the statute ol" frauds was without merit, there 
was no admission in \i\^ okauings or ?A ina! tluu CwUlu , . ••• ..rd\ Lonstiute an 
exception t :) the stall ite of frai ids as set forth a bo\ e ' I b the contrary , the ow ner 
expressly denied the alleged oral agreement to extend the listing agreement and the 
broker argued that it was entitled i w - ^ v i h i ^ h ^ u k w ^sue ol lact rcsohed at trial. 
hi IJ( i1"' I lie cv. .''w.. -J ; ••..*' * ' o I'Viiin .HI mlniissiuii 
pleadings or at trial was >imph not ai JSMIC in this case. 
Similarly, in Mactnm Humpst/in i*iop* , hu • W t.^tcrn A\w/ Lstaie d IXv. 
Ct > 7 791 \2( 1 • , • ^ • -\i i . 
appeals in finding that Mr. Matthews' argument concerning the statute of frauds 
was without merit, the admission in pleadings or at trial exception to the statute of 
based upon deposition testimony which the broker argued constituted an admission 
of the oral agreement to pay the commission, but the appellate court expressly 
refused lo address lite mrnls of"(his argument because il was raised lor the lirsl lime 
on appeal, hd. at 23-6. 
3 U 
Mr. Matthews' argument with respect to a well-recognized exception to the 
statute of frauds does have a substantial basis in law (L.P. Bentley v. Potter and 
English v. Standard Optical Co.) and fact (Mr. Jaffa's admissions). Even if this 
Court disagrees with such argument, to characterize such argument as "without 
merit" for purposes of awarding attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 
(1988) would have an undue chilling effect on legitimate advocacy based upon 
well-established legal principles and facts in support thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' affirmance of the trial court's denial of Mr. Matthews' claim and judgment 
in favor of Olympus, and remand with directions to the trial court to enter an order 
requiring Olympus to pay the full amount of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as an 
approved claim due to the failure of Olympus to timely reject the claim in writing as 
mandated by statute. 
If the relief requested above is granted, then this Court must also reverse the 
award of attorney fees because Olympus would no longer be a prevailing party as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Even if the relief requested above is not granted, then this Court should still 
reverse the awards of attorney fees by the district court and the court of appeals 
because the claim and various legal arguments advanced on behalf of Mr. Matthews 
were based in law and fact and were not "without merit" for purposes of awarding 
attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
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Dated this 9m day of April, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON 
Counsel for David C Matthews 
Claimant and Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Matthews v. Olympus Construction, LC, 2007 UT App 361, 173 P.3d 192 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
In re Olympus Construction, LC 
David C. Matthews, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Olympus Construction, LC, 
Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060739-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 8, 2007) 
2007 UT App 361 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
020904299 
Attorneys: Dwayne A. Vance, Park City, for Appellant 
Steven T. Waterman, Brent D. Wride, and Steven C, 
Strong, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Hi David C. Matthews appeals from the trial court's grant of 
Olympus Construction, LC's (Olympus) motion for summary judgment 
dismissing Matthewsfs claim for an unpaid real estate commission 
and the trial court!s award of attorney fees to Olympus. We 
affirm and remand for the award of attorney fees that Olympus 
incurred on appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
i[2 In June 1998, Matthews worked as a licensed real estate 
agent for Re/Max Brokers, LC (Re/Max) . In August 1998, Olympus 
retained Matthews!s real estate services to help it purchase 
property in Summit County, Utah. The parties entered into a real 
estate purchase contract that provided a $200 commission to 
Matthews. Matthews contends that an agent of Olympus orally 
promised to pay him an additional $100,000 commission when the 
property was sold. 
%3 In 1999, Matthews's wife, who had been an associate broker 
for Re/Max, became licensed as a principal broker. Matthews and 
his wife ended their business relationship with Re/Max and began 
their own brokerage firm called Re/Max Town and Country. 
f4 In January 2002, Olympus filed a Petition for Judicial 
Dissolution. The trial court appointed a receiver in 2002, and a 
successor receiver (Receiver) in 2003.1 Pursuant to a motion 
filed by the Receiver, the court entered an order (the Bar Date 
Order) establishing June 30, 2004 as "the bar date for all claims 
to be filed against [Olympus's] receivership estate." 
%5 On June 30, 2004, the bar date, Matthews filed a Notice of 
Claim against Olympus for the $100,000 commission. In this 
notice, Matthew identified himself as the "Creditor," which the 
claim form defined as the "person or other entity to whom Olympus 
owes money or property." On October 6, 2004, the Receiver sent a 
letter to Matthews!s counsel requesting that Matthews withdraw 
his claim and indicating that if he did not, the Receiver 
intended to "proceed with litigation." In November 2004, the 
Receiver requested that the trial court set a new date as the 
deadline for rejecting claims. Matthews opposed this motion, 
asserting that his claim was considered approved under Utah Code 
section 48-2C-1305(4) because Olympus had not rejected the claim 
within ninety days as required by that section. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2002). In March 2005, the trial court 
granted Olympus's request for a new rejection date and denied 
Matthews's motion asking the court to require the Receiver to pay 
his claim. The Receiver rejected Matthews's claim in April 2005 
and warned Matthews that she would pursue a judgment for attorney 
fees if Matthews continued to pursue his claim. 
%6 The trial court granted Olympus's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that Matthews's claim was barred by both 
the statute of frauds, see id. § 25-5-4 (1) (e) (Supp. 2007), and 
Utah's real estate statutes concerning the collection of broker's 
fees, see id. §§ 61-2-10, 18 (2006). The trial court also 
awarded Olympus $25,112.50 in attorney fees after concluding that 
Matthews had acted in bad faith and that his claim was without 
merit. This amount included compensation for seventeen hours the 
Receiver spent in her capacity as an attorney. Matthews appeals 
1. Only the actions of the successor receiver are at issue in 
this case. We refer to her as the Receiver, and make no further 
mention of the initial receiver. 
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both the trial court's entry of summary judgment and its award of 
attorney fees to Olympus. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1[7 Matthews first contends the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Olympus based on the statute of frauds and 
Utah's broker licensing statutes. Summary judgment is 
permissible when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R, Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate, "we 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
affording those legal conclusions no deference," and "view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party," Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 
33, H 15, 44 P.3d 781 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
f8 Matthews next argues that the trial court incorrectly 
extended the date by which the Receiver was required to reject 
claims. Matthews contends that the Receiver was bound by Utah 
Code section 48-2C-1305 (4), which mandates that claims must be 
rejected within ninety days or they will be "considered 
approved." Utah Code Ann. § 48~2c-1305 (4) . We review the trial 
court's interpretation of the statute for correctness without 
deference to the trial court. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 
1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) . 
%9 Additionally, Matthews argues that the trial court 
incorrectly awarded attorney fees to Olympus after finding that 
Matthews's claim was without merit and was pursued in bad faith. 
The court's determination that Matthews's claim was without merit 
is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Jeschke 
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial 
court's determination that Matthews7s claim was filed in bad 
faith is a question of fact that we review under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard. See id. 
flO Finally, we review the trial court's award of attorney fees 
for time the Receiver spent in her capacity as an attorney. The 
"trial court has 'broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard.1" 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)). 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Statute of Frauds 
Ull Matthews contends that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Olympus on the basis of the statute of 
frauds. Under our statute of frauds, lf[E]very agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell 
real estate for compensation" is void "unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed 
by the party to be charged with the agreement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-4 (1) (e) (Supp. 2007). Matthews is correct that the 
original agreement, which contained the $2 00 commission, 
satisfies the statute of frauds. However, "if an original 
agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement 
which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy 
the requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable," 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). 
Matthews admits that the $100,000 commission was promised to him 
orally and that no written documentation of it exists. 
Accordingly, the alleged modification for $100,000 is 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 
Kl2 Matthews attempts to circumvent this rule by pointing to a 
narrow exception to the statute of frauds. In Bentley v. Potter, 
694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that "the 
statute of frauds is a defense that can be waived by . . . 
admitting its existence in the pleadings, or admitting at trial 
the existence and all essential terms of the contract." Id. at 
621 (citations omitted). Matthews argues that this exception 
applies because a representative of Olympus promised him a 
$100,000 commission and Matthews himself filed an affidavit 
saying so. However, the Potter exception exists only to ensure 
that "the one opposing the claim cannot complain if he admits the 
existence of the guarantee." Id. It does not apply when the 
party making the claim simply aisserts the admission in either the 
pleadings or at trial. 
Hl3 Matthews goes on to insist that a factual dispute exists--
whether an oral promise to pay was made--and asks us to reverse 
the trial court's summary judgment ruling. This we decline to 
do. The essential factual issue here is not in question: there 
is no written agreement concerning the $100,000 commission. We 
addressed this issue in Wardlev Corp. Better Homes & Gardens v. 
Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), where we upheld the 
trial court's ruling of summary judgment despite the outstanding 
factual question of whether the parties orally agreed to a 
modification of a written real estate agreement. See id. at 477. 
In Burgess, we held that whether there had been an oral agreement 
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was irrelevant, because such oral agreement would nevertheless be 
void under the statute of frauds. See id. We explained that 
[t]he very adoption of a statute of frauds 
reflects the [1] egislature's considered 
judgment that, with certain kinds of 
important arrangements, it is preferable to 
invalidate a few otherwise legitimate 
agreements because they were not written than 
to burden the system and the citizenry with 
claims premised on bogus, unwritten 
agreements. 
Id. at 478. Furthermore, requiring such agreements and 
modifications to be in writing is consistent with our position 
that "a broker [or agent] must be presumed to know that an oral 
contract of employment for rendition of services in negotiating a 
sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan 
Hampshire Props., Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 
P.2d 230, 234 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
f14 In sum, any modification to the original contract needed to 
be in writing. Because it was not, the modification is void 
under the statute of frauds. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's ruling on this matter.2 
2. Because Matthews's claim is barred by the statute of frauds, 
we need not consider the alternative basis of the trial court's 
ruling that Matthewsfs claim was barred because it violated 
Utah's broker licensing statutes. Nevertheless, this alternative 
ground further demonstrates the lack of merit of Matthewsf s 
claim. In Utah, only licensed brokers are eligible to bring 
claims for unpaid commissions. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18 
(2006) . Matthews does not suggest that he was ever a licensed 
broker. Instead he argues that, because a Re/Max broker assigned 
the claim to Matthewsf s wife, who then assigned the claim to him, 
he stands in the shoes of the broker and can therefore sue in his 
own name. However, our case law has been insistent that only 
licensed brokers may sue to collect commissions. See Morris v. 
John Price Assocs., Inc., 590 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah 1979) (holding 
that a real estate agent was barred from collecting a promised 
commission from the defendant because of the language of Utah 
Cede section 61-2-18). See also Young v. Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 
259 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1953) (holding that Utah Code sections 
82-2-18 and 82-2-10 (now numbered 61-2-18 and 61-2-10) unite to 
ensure that "any action to recover a fee or commission must be 
instituted and brought by the broker under whom the salesman is 
employed") . Accordingly, this argument also fails. 
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II. Section 48-2C-1305 of the Utah Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act 
H15 Matthews next contends that the Receiver was bound by the 
provisions of section 48-2c-1305 of the Utah Revised Limited 
Liability Company Act, which offers guidelines to dissolved 
companies that are in the process of winding up. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-1305 (2002). Specifically, Matthews argues that the 
Receiver was bound by the deadline in subsection 4: "Claims 
which are not rejected by the dissolved company in writing within 
90 days after receipt of the claim by the dissolved company shall 
be considered approved." Id. § 48-2c-1305 (4) . There is no 
dispute that Olympus did not reject Matthewsfs claim within 
ninety days. Thus, Matthews argues, the claim was "considered 
approved," which he asserts meant it had to be paid without any 
further inquiry. 
i|l6 We first consider whether the court was precluded from 
extending the period for the rejection of claims. Judicial 
dissolutions are enabled by Part 12 of the Utah Revised 
Limited Liability Company Act, see id. §§ 48-2C-1201 to -1214 
(2002 & Supp. 2007). The judge overseeing the dissolution may: 
11
 (a) issue an injunction; (b) appoint a receiver . . . with all 
powers and duties the court directs; (c) take other action 
required to preserve the company's assets wherever located; and 
(d) carry on the business of the company until a full hearing can 
be held." Id- § 48-2C-1211(3) (Supp. 2007). Further, "[t]he 
court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction over the company and all 
of its property." Id^ _ § 48-2C-1212 (1) (2002). Finally, " [t] he 
court shall describe the powers and duties of the receiver . . . 
in its appointing order, which may be amended from time to time." 
Id. § 48-2c-1212~(3) . 
1|l7 In this case, the courtf s appointing order named the 
Receiver and indicated the scope of the court's continuing power 
over the Receiver's duties: 
[The Receiver] shall wind up the business and 
affairs of Olympus as provided in Part 13 of 
the Utah Limited Liability Company Act . . . 
[and] shall exercise all the powers of a 
receiver of a limited liability company 
provided for by law or equity, except as her 
powers may be specifically circumscribed or 
expanded by the terms of this Order or any 
subsequent order of the Court. 
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Except as otherwise provided herein the 
Receiver may dispose of known and unknown 
claims against Olympus by notice and/or 
publication, may set dates for the barring of 
such claims and may accept or reject claims 
all as provided in Utah Code . . . [s]ections 
48-2C-1305 and 1306. To the extent permitted 
by law, all claims filed against Olympus 
shall be adjudicated and determined by this 
Court in and as part of this proceeding. 
Nothing in this Order shall prevent the 
Receiver from requesting augmentation, 
modification, or supplementation of her 
powers as Receiver to the full extent 
permitted by law or equity upon further 
application to the [clourt and after notice 
and a hearing, 
(Emphasis added.) The court entered the Bar Date Order but did 
not address how claims filed were to be resolved, The Bar Date 
Order does not include any provision for the automatic allowance 
of claims. Rather, it states "the filing of a claim by a 
creditor against Olympus does not necessarily mean that it will 
be allowed. The Receiver . . . reserves the right to file an 
objection to all or a portion of any filed claim." 
K 18 We conclude that because the statutory language governing 
receiverships grants great latitude to the trial court and 
because the trial courtfs orders explicitly state the trial court 
may expand and modify the powers of the Receiver, the court could 
extend the period for rejecting claims. Moreover, section 48-2c-
1305 itself is permissive: "A dissolved company in winding up 
may dispose of the known claims against it by following the 
procedures described in this section." Id. § 48-2c-1305 (1) 
(emphasis added). Further, the trial court's order makes it 
clear that the Receiver had the right to reject any claim as she 
did. We conclude that the court had the power to extend the time 
for rejecting claims and that Matthews's claims were properly 
rejected-3 
3 . We need not reach the issue of the consequences of a receiver 
not timely rejecting a claim, as we hold Matthews!s claim was 
properly rejected. 
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III. Attorney Fees 
A. Claims without merit and brought in bad faith 
1|l9 The trial court awarded attorney fees to Olympus based on 
rule 56(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(g), and Utah Code section 78-27-56, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (2002), concluding that Matthews!s claim was brought 
in bad faith and was without merit. 
1(2 0 Rule 56 authorizes a court to award attorney fees if 
affidavits presented on summary judgment are brought in bad 
faith: 
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting 
them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of 
the affidavits caused, including reasonable 
attorney [] fees. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g) . We review findings of bad faith for abuse 
of discretion. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P. 2d 202, 204 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
1J21 The trial court concluded that Matthews' s legal arguments 
were "without merit" because he. "knew (or [was] charged with 
knowing) that his claim was barred by the statute of frauds and 
the Utah broker commission statutes." Utah Code section 78-27-56 
provides that "the court shall award attorney[] fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action is 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. A claim is without merit if it is 
"frivolous," is "of little weight or importance having no basis 
in law or fact," or if it "cleairly [lacks a] legal basis for 
recovery." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). We 
review the trial court's conclusions that an argument is "without 
merit" for correctness, as this is a question of law. Jeschke, 
811 P.2d at 203. 
f22 The trial court based its findings of bad faith on a series 
of sworn statements by Matthews, including affidavits, answers to 
interrogatories, and various motions that contained inconsistent 
information. Owing to these inconsistencies, the trial court 
concluded that at least some of the documents were offered in bad 
faith: 
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Whether false statements were made in 
Matthewsfs sworn statements and admissions 
that the alleged $100,000 commission was 
promised to him and owed to him in his own 
right for his own efforts, or in Matthews's 
later sworn statements that the alleged 
$100,000 commission was promised and owed to 
Re/Max Town & Country with his wife as 
principal broker, or in Matthews!s last 
representations in the last-minute 
"Supplemental Memorandum" that the alleged 
$100,000 commission was promised and owed to 
Fred B. Law and then indirectly assigned to 
him, it is clear that Matthews made 
materially false and patently inconsistent 
statements in this proceeding, and that 
Matthews knew (or is charged with knowing) 
that those statements were false when he made 
them. 
Matthews!s assertions are not caused by a 
faulty memory because they are key, 
essential, and material facts including that 
Matthews was never a licensed principal 
broker. 
Matthews!s own discovery responses along 
with the second affidavit of his wife, Jane 
Matthews, conclusively establish that 
Matthews knew his own affidavit on file with 
this [c]ourt contained false statements, yet 
neither Matthews nor his counsel withdrew or 
amended it. 
Matthews knew (or is charged with knowing) 
that his claim was barred by the statute of 
frauds and the Utah broker commission 
statutes. 
Utah case law supports a conclusion in this 
case that the Matthews!s [c]laim was not 
asserted or pursued in good faith, because 
Matthewsf s presumed knowledge of Utah law 
respecting commission agreements and 
commission collections, and his materially 
false sworn statements, are,"certainly 
sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith," and because M< 
claim for "no other apparent reason" than to "drive up the costs 
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of litigation" in trying to recover a claim he knew he was not 
entitled to pursue. 
(Citations omitted.) 
^23 We agree with the trial court that Matthews knew or should 
have known that his claim was barred by the statute of frauds and 
Utah's broker commission statutes. Further, given the trial 
court's repeated statements about the breadth of its supervision 
over the Receiver, and the permissive applicability of section 
13 05 of the Limited Liability Act, we conclude his claim for 
automatic payment of a meritless claim was also without merit. 
B. Attorney fees for Receiver's time 
1(24 Finally, Matthews challenges the trial court's award of 
attorney fees to Olympus for seventeen hours the Receiver spent 
in her capacity as an attorney. Matthews contends that attorney 
fees cannot be paid to the Receiver because she spent that time 
as a pro se litigant, not as an attorney for Olympus. We 
disagree. 
1|25 It is true that we do not award attorney fees to lawyers who 
are representing themselves. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996) . However, 
the fact that the Receiver is standing in for Olympus does not 
make her a litigant on her own behalf. As a receiver, she is a 
court-appointed representative, not a litigant. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees for the 
small amount of time the Receiver spent in her capacity as an 
attorney. 
^26 Matthews also contends that any fees attributable to the 
administrative complaint Olympus pursued as well as any fees 
attributable to excess and unnecessary time Olympus spent on this 
matter are not recoverable. However, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the work counsel performed 
was necessary and that the amount of time spent was appropriate. 
The attorney fees awarded in connection with that finding are 
therefore affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
1(27 We affirm. We conclude that the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment where the alleged oral modification of 
the brokerage contract was void under the statute of frauds. We 
also agree with the trial court that it retained sufficient power 
over the case to grant an extension of time for rejection of 
claims as the Receiver requested. Moreover, we affirm the trial 
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court's award of attorney fees on the basis that Matthewsfs 
claims were without merit and the suit was brought in bad faith. 
We also affirm the award of attorney fees for the Receiver's 
work. We further award attorney fees to Olympus on appeal and 
remand for the calculation of such reasonable attorney fees. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
U28 WE CONCUR: 
Carolyn B, McHugh, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
Minute Entry, March 29, 2005; unsigned Order Denying Mr. Matthews' 
Motion to Pay Claim (R. 2140-2146). 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: : MINUTE ENTRY 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C., : CASE NO. 020904299 
David C. Matthews' Proposed Order Denying Motion to Pay Claim 
is filed unsigned for the reasons set forth in the Receiver's 
Objection. Unless the parties agree otherwise with approval of the 
Court, the Matthews claim will be resolved in accordance with the 
Claim Resolution Procedures approved by the Court. 
This signed Minute Entry shall constitute the Order of the 
Court resolving the matters referenced herein. 
Dated this day of March, 2005. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e 
f o r e g o i n g M i n u t e E n t r y , t o t h e f o l l o w i n g , t h i s ^ / d a y of March, 
2 0 0 5 : 
J a m e s S . L o w r i e 
R i c k L . Knuth 
R o s s I . Romero 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P e t i t i o n e r s 
1 7 0 S . Main , S u i t e 1500 
P . O . Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
D a r r y l J . Lee 
A t t o r n e y for Responden t s S c o t t J a f f a 
and S h e r i J a f f a 
60 E. South Temple, S u i t e 500 
S a l e Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
A n n e t t e W. J a r v i s 
S t e v e n T. Waterman 
S t e v e n C. S t rong 
A t t o r n e y s fo r R e c e i v e r , A n n e t t e W. J a r v i s 
36 S. S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 1400 
P . O . Box 45385 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145-0385 
Dwayne A. Vance 
A t t o r n e y for David C. Matthews 
22 00 N. Park Avenue, S u i t e D2 00 
P . O . Box 682800 
P a r k C i t y , UT 84068-2800 
Dwayne A. Vance (7109) 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
P.O. Box 682800 
2200 N. Park Avenue, Suite D200 
Park City, Utah 84068-2800 
Telephone: (435) 649-8209 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8428 
Attorneys for David C. Matthews 
? JIED nmmm COURT 
"Hiiro Judicial District 
MAR 2 ; . 2005 
ftUf'VAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: ; 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. ; 
) ORDER DENYING MR. MATTHEWS' 
) MOTION TO PAY CLAIM 
) Civil No. 020904299 
1 Judge Tyrone Medley 
A Motion to Pay Claim was filed on behalf of David C. Matthews ("Mr. Matthews"), a 
purported creditor of Olympus Construction, L.C. ("Olympus"), which was opposed by the 
Receiver. A Hearing was held on February 28, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. regarding this matter, with 
counsel appearing on behalf of both the Receiver and Mr. Matthews. Based upon the legal 
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and the arguments of counsel at 
the Hearing, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The disposal of claims against Olympus was previously addressed in this Court's 
Successor Receiver Order entered on May 6, 2003 (''Successor Receiver Ordef), f^ 4, uhich 
states, "the Receiver may dispose of known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice 
and/or publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims 
all as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306." The procedures referenced in the 
Successor Receiver Order were not mandatory, but rather were phrased in terms of discretionary 
procedures that the Receiver "may" pursue if desired. 
2. Pursuant to the Receiver's authority as set forth in the Successor Receiver Order, on 
December 2, 2003 the Receiver filed a Motion for Declaratory Relief and Establishing a Claim 
Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure, whereby the Receiver sought approval for June 30, 2004 
as a claim bar date by which date known claimants against Olympus were required to file a 
written Notice of Claim or their claim would be forever barred, and whereby the Receiver further 
sought approval for the notice of the requested claim bar date to be provided by the Receiver and 
approval for the form of the written Notice of Claim to be submitted by the claimants. The 
Receiver's motion for establishing the claim bar date was expressly based on Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 48-2c-1305 and -1306, as referenced in paragraph 4 of the Successor Receiver Order. 
3. Because no objections to the Receiver's foregoing motion had been filed, on February 
26, 2004 the Court entered an Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Establishing a Claim Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure, which established June 30,2004 as 
the claim bar date, and further approved the requested form of notice to known claimants and the 
written Notice of Claim to be filed by the claimants. 
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4. Mr. Matthews timely filed a Notice of Claim on June 30, 2004, claiming that Olympus 
owed him the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). His Notice of Claim 
merely represents prima facie evidence of the existence of such claim, and may be disputed by 
the Receiver pursuant to the claim resolution procedures established by this Court. 
5. Mr. Matthews has filed a motion to pay his claim, arguing that his claim should be 
considered approved for payment under Section 48-2c-l305(4), which provides: ''Claims which 
are not rejected by the dissolved company in writing within 90 days after receipt of the claim by 
the dissolved company shall be considered approved." It is undisputed that the Receiver did not 
reject Mr. Matthews' claim in writing within 90 days of receiving that claim. 
6. The Court concludes that the Receiver is not bound by the 90-day time period in 
Section 48-2c-1305(4) for rejection of timely filed claims against Olympus after a claim bar date 
has been established, but rather the disposal of claims against Olympus in this judicial 
proceeding is subject to the equitable powers of this Court and the role of this Court as final 
arbiter of any and all claims against Olympus. 
7. Accordingly, Mr. Matthews' Motion to Pay Claim is hereby denied. 
Dated this day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lO11' day of March, 2005,1 mailed, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying Mr. Matthews' Motion 
Annette W. Jarvis 
Steven C. Strong 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
P.O. Box 45385 
36 S. State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Rick Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM C 
Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment and Disallowing 
Claim of David C. Matthews (R. 3037-3039). 
Order Prepared by: 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Steven C. Strong (6340) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801)532-7543 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISALLOWING CLAIM OF 
DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
On October 24, 2005, the Court conducted a hearing as scheduled upon good and 
sufficient notice on the Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment to Disallow Claim of David 
C. Matthews (the "Motion"), which was filed on or about July 6, 2005 by Annette W. Jarvis in 
her capacity as the court-appointed receiver (the "Receiver") for Olympus Construction, L.C. in 
this receivership case. 
Steven C. Strong, Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C , appeared as counsel for the Receiver 
(who was also present), and David Thompson and Dwayne A. Vance, Miller Vance & 
Thompson, appeared as counsel for David C. Matthews. 
Based on the memoranda, affidavits, and other papers filed in support of and in 
opposition to the Motion, and based on the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court made 
its findings and conclusions on the record at the conclusion of the hearing, which findings and 
conclusions are incorporated herein, and THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Summary judgment in favor of the Receiver and against David C. 
Matthews is granted as requested in the Motion; 
2. The claim of David C. Matthews is barred by the Utah statute of frauds, 
Utah Code § 25-5-4, as well as by applicable Utah statutes governing real estate broker 
commissions, including Utah Code §§ 61-2-18 and 61-2-10; and 
3. The claim of David C. Matthews is disallowed as a matter of law. 
DATED this day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tyrone E. Medley 
Third Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
Miller Vance & Thompson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER was 
served by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this ^ £ # day of October, 2005, to each of 
the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
Rick L. Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
845560.1 
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ADDENDUM D 
Order and Judgment Granting Attorney Fee Award against David C. 
Matthews; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning 
Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees Relating to claim of David C. 
Matthews (R. 3155-3286), 
Order and Judgment prepared by: 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Steven C. Strong (6340) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST 
DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to this Court's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONCERNING RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF 
DA VID C. MATTHEWS, entered June 12,2006, and this Court's MINUTE ENTRY entered June 
12, 2006, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 0 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By-
Deputy Clerk 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AND DIRECTS THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment shall be and hereby is entered in the amount of $25,112.50 against 
David C. Matthews and in favor of Annette W. Jarvis, Receiver of Olympus Construction, L.C, 
which amount is the reasonable attorney fees awarded in connection with the meritless claim 
pursued in bad faith by David C. Matthews in this receivership case; and 
2. Although the receivership case involves multiple claims and multiple parties, the 
Court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay and thus directs that entry of the 
judgment for attorney fees set forth above, and the related ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISALLOWING CLAIM OF DAVID C. 
MATTHEWS entered December 20,2005, shall together constitute the final judgment, pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), respecting the claim of David C. Matthews and the related award of 
attorney fees. 
DATED this J ^ day of July, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [Proposed] JUDGMENT 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST DAVID C. 
MATTHEWS was served by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of June, 
2006, to each of the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
Rick L. Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
881509vl 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT GRANTING ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
was served by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this Jp3b day of July, 2006, to each of 
the following: 
Steven C. Strong 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
RickL.Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
>)QJAJL*Y 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Annette W. Jarvis, in her capacity as the court-appointed receiver (the "Receiver") of 
Olympus Construction, L.C. ("Olympus"), filed the Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees 
Relating to Claim of David C. Matthews (the "Motion"). By the Motion, the Receiver seeks an 
order requiring David C. Matthews ("Matthews") to pay some of the Receiver's reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in responding to the Notice of Claim filed by Matthews (the "Matthews 
Claim") in this receivership case. The Motion is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, which 
permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party if the action "was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith," and on Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g), which permits an award of 
attorney fees if affidavits presented in summary judgment litigation "are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay." The Receiver claims that both Section 78-27-56 and Rule 56(g) 
apply to the Matthews Claim and entitle the Receiver to an award of her reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in opposing the Matthews Claim. The Court enters these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in accordance with Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 1 
1. Matthews signed the Matthews Claim on June 7, 2004, and filed the claim in this 
receivership case on June 30, 2004. 
2. Pursuant to the Matthews Claim, Matthews asserted that Olympus owes him 
$100,000 for his services as a real estate broker in connection with Olympus's purchase of real 
property in Summit County in 1998. 
3. The face of the "Notice of Claim" form on which Matthews asserted his claim 
indicates that by signing and filing the claim, Matthews was swearing and attesting "to the 
truthfulness and accuracy" of the claim under penalty of perjury. 
4. The "Notice of Claim" form clearly identifies "David C. Matthews" as the 
"Creditor," which the form defines as the "person or other entity to whom Olympus owes 
money or property." 
1
 The relevant facts are of record in the following documents on file with the Court: (1) the 
Amended Claim Response on Behalf of David C. Matthews (including a copy of the Receiver's 
letter of October 6,2004 attached as an exhibit thereto) (filed May 12,2005); (2) the 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment to Disallow 
Claim of David C. Matthews (filed July 6,2005); (3) the Affidavit of Annette W. Jarvis 
(including a copy of the Matthews Claim and all supporting documents attached as exhibits 
thereto) (filed July 6,2005); (4) the Affidavit of Carrie A. Hurst (including exhibits) (filed July 
6,2005); (5) the Memorandum in Opposition to Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(including the affidavits of David Matthews and Jane Matthews attached as exhibits thereto) 
(filed August 12,2005); (6) the Reply in Support of Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment 
to Disallow Claim of David C. Matthews (including Matthews' discovery responses attached as 
an exhibit thereto) (filed August 26, 2005); (7) the second Affidavit of Carrie A. Hurst 
(including exhibit) (filed August 26, 2005); (8) the Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition 
to Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment (including affidavits of Jane Matthews and Fred 
B. Law attached as exhibits thereto) (filed October 20,2005); and (9) the Receiver's Response 
to "Supplemental Memorandum" of David C. Matthews (filed October 21,2005). 
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5. Nothing on the face of the Matthews Claim or in any of the documents Matthews 
submitted to the Receiver as attachments to the claim indicates that the alleged $100,000 real 
estate commission was promised or owed to any person or entity other than Matthews in his 
direct, individual capacity. 
6. After investigating the grounds for the Matthews Claim, the Receiver determined 
that the claim was meritless. 
7. The Receiver sent a letter dated October 6, 2004 to Matthews' counsel requesting 
that Matthews withdraw his claim and specifically notifying Matthews that if he did not, the 
Receiver intended to "proceed with litigation in the Receivership Court to obtain summary 
disallowance of the Matthews Claim" and would seek "court costs and attorneys fees from Mr. 
Matthews to the extent allowed by law." 
8. The Receiver incurred substantial attorney fees on behalf of Olympus in various 
reasonable efforts to oppose the Matthews Claim, including (but not limited to) attempting to 
convince Matthews to withdraw the claim without litigation, successfully opposing Matthews' 
motion to compel immediate payment of the claim, formally opposing the claim pursuant to the 
court-approved claim resolution procedures in effect in this receivership case, and successfully 
prosecuting a summary judgment motion and obtaining a ruling disallowing the claim as a 
matter of law. 
9. On May 12,2005, Matthews filed his Amended Claim Response (the "Claim 
Response") addressing the Receiver's formal objection to the Matthews Claim. 
10. Nothing in the Claim Response indicated that Matthews was claiming he was an 
assignee of a claim held by a real estate broker named Fred B. Law. 
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11. Matthews contended that the documents submitted to the Receiver in connection 
with the Matthews Claim "clearly establish the existence of a broker relationship between Mr. 
Matthews and Olympus." Claim Response at 2-3. 
12. Matthews asserted that Olympus "agreed to pay Mr. Matthews a $100,000 
commission" (Claim Response at 3), that the claimed $100,000 commission "represents 
compensation for services provided by Mr. Matthews" (Claim Response at 3), that Matthews 
"performed valuable services in conjunction with the acquisition of the subject real property in 
reliance upon the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 in exchange for such services" 
(Claim Response at 7), that "the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 was made . . . as an 
inducement for Mr. Matthews to provide services" (Claim Response at 8), and that "Mr. 
Matthews did not have a cognizable action against Olympus until Olympus breached its 
promise to pay Mr. Matthews the $100,000" (Claim Response at 9). 
13. Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute of frauds by 
arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting citations to the contrary, that 
the commission amount was not an essential contract term and need not be in writing. 
14. Matthews argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a limited 
exception under Utah case law that only applies when a defendant has admitted, either in 
pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract exists. 
15. Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted the 
existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn statement. 
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16. Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was made in late 
1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of Olympus as evidence of 
the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. 
17. Matthews admitted that his attempt to obtain a signed writing from Richard Jaffa 
to evidence the alleged oral promise was unsuccessful. 
18. After the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission statutes, 
Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by arguing, contrary to his 
original position, that he was an assignee of a claim belonging to a principal broker and that he 
could pursue the assignor's claim in his own name. 
19. In Request No. 14 of the Receiver's Requests for Admission pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 36, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that your filing of the Matthews Claim 
and related papers in the receivership court is an attempt by you to obtain payment of the real 
estate commission from someone other than a principal broker." 
20. In Request No. 16, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that Re-Max 
Brokers, L.C. was the principal brokerage with which you were affiliated during the period 
August 1998 through December 1998." 
21. In Interrogatory No. 4 of the Receiver's Interrogatories propounded to Matthews 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 33, Matthews identified all principal brokers with whom he was 
affiliated, and Matthews stated, in relevant part: "Jane Matthews principal broker in 1998," but 
Matthews made no mention of Fred B. Law. 
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22. In Interrogatory No. 6, Matthews identified "all persons who may have 
information concerning the Matthews Claim," including the names of twelve specific 
individuals, but did not list Fred B. Law. 
23. In response to the Receiver5 s Requests for Production of Documents made to 
Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 34, the only document Matthews produced was a copy of 
a one-page "Certificate of Licensure" issued by the Utah Division of Real Estate concerning the 
real estate license of David C. Matthews, which Certificate clearly indicates that Matthews was 
licensed as an Associate Broker of "Re-Max Brokers" from February 1998 to March 1999, and 
did not become affiliated with "Re-Max Town & Country" until February 2001. 
24. The Certificate is consistent with Matthews' response to Request for Admission 
No. 16 noted above, but is inconsistent with the false statements in his affidavit discussed 
below. 
25. In his response to Request for Admission No. 6, Matthews admitted that at all 
relevant times he was "bound by the Utah statutes and administrative rules applicable to 
licensed real estate associate brokers." 
26. In response to Request No. 10, Matthews admitted that he "personally asked 
Richard Jaffa to provide [to Matthews] a signed document indicating that Olympus had agreed 
to pay [Matthews] a $100,000 real estate commission in connection with Olympus's purchase of 
the Property in December 1998, but he [Jaffa] refused to do so." 
27. In the Receiver's initial memorandum filed July 6,2005 in support of her 
summary judgment motion, the Receiver argued that the Matthews Claim was barred as a 
matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and also by Utah real estate commission statutes. 
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28. In Matthew's Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of perjury on June 
7, 2004, in Matthew's Claim Response filed May 12, 2005, and in Matthew's sworn and binding 
answers to the Receiver's written discovery requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the 
alleged oral promise to pay a $100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and 
gave rise to a payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him. 
29. On August 12, 2005, when Matthews filed his memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out that under Utah law 
only a principal broker could pursue a commission claim against Olympus), Matthews stated 
under oath that the alleged oral promise actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and 
Country," and that his wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had 
assigned the claim to him. 
30. On October 20, 2005, when Matthews filed his "Supplemental Memorandum" 
and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out the false statements in the two prior 
affidavits), Matthews changed his story again by asserting that it was not actually his wife who 
was the principal broker entitled to assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had 
orally assigned the claim to Matthews' wife, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews. 
31. On August 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Receiver's motion for summary judgment, and in support thereof, he also filed the Affidavit of 
David C. Matthews (the "David Matthews Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews 
(the "Jane Matthews Affidavit"). 
32. The David Matthews Affidavit contains false statements that directly contradict 
Matthews' prior representations and statements made under penalty of pequry including in 
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paragraph 4 of the affidavit wherein Matthews states that in 1998, he and his wife owed a real 
estate brokerage company in Park City named "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his wife 
was the principal broker. 
33. The Certificate of Licensure in Matthews' own possession that he produced in 
response to the Receiver's document request clearly shows that Matthews did not become 
affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February 2001, more than two years after the 
December 1998 transaction. 
34. The statement in paragraph 4 of the Matthews Affidavit directly contradicts 
Matthews' answer to Request for Admission No. 16. 
35. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the David Matthews Affidavit, Matthews states, that the 
alleged promise by Olympus to pay a $100,000 commission was made directly "to Re/Max" 
rather than to Matthews personally. 
36. Paragraph 12 of the David Matthews Affidavit states that Matthews' pursuit of the 
$100,000 commission "has been in my capacity as the assignee from my wife of the 
Commission," which statement directly contradicts the statements Matthews made under 
penalty of perjury on the face of the Matthews Claim and his other statements and 
representations alleging that the $100,000 commission was promised to him personally and 
earned by him personally, and that he was pursuing the claim in his own right and in his own 
name as the "Creditor" to whom Olympus owed the money. 
37. The Jane Matthews Affidavit contains similar false statements concerning Jane 
Matthews' alleged status as the principal broker of Re/Max Town and Country in 1998. 
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38. The false statements in the David Matthews Affidavit and the Jane Matthews 
Affidavit caused the Receiver to incur additional legal fees, including but not limited to those 
incurred in investigating the new allegations, obtaining a Certificate of Licensure concerning 
Jane Matthews, and pointing out those false statements to this Court in the Receiver's reply 
memorandum in support of summary judgment. 
39. Nearly two months after the Receiver's reply memorandum was served, and only 
three business days before the summary judgment hearing, Matthews served a second 
"Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews" admitting that her prior affidavit contained false statements, 
admitting that "Re-Max Brokers, L.C." (not Re/Max Town and Country) was the brokerage 
with which she and Matthews were associated in 1998, and admitting that she was not a 
principal broker at the relevant time. 
40. Although the new affidavit of Jane Matthews contradicted and purportedly 
corrected some of her prior sworn statements regarding these facts, no new affidavit for David 
Matthews was submitted to withdraw or amend his own false affidavit on these same points. 
41. The only affidavit of David Matthews on file with this Court contains materially 
false statements that Matthews' knows are false. 
42. In addition to purporting to correct prior false statements in her affidavit, the new 
affidavit of Jane Matthews stated that an individual named Fred B. Law was the principal 
broker with which both she and Matthews were affiliated in 1998, and that Mr. Law had 
assigned the $100,000 commission claim to Jane Matthews, who in turn assigned the claim to 
Matthews. 
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43. Matthews filed the new affidavit of Jane Matthews on October 20, 2005 along 
with his "Supplemental Memorandum." 
44. In the "Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews adopted his new "Fred Law 
assignment" theory as the basis for his claim, and he also included an affidavit of Fred B. Law. 
45. In late October 2005, less than 3 business days before the summary judgment 
hearing and more than 16 months after Matthews signed the Matthews Claim under penalty of 
perjury, Matthews asserted for the first time that the $100,000 claim he was pursuing against 
Olympus was actually a claim of Remax Brokers, L.C., with Fred B. Law as principal broker 
that Matthews held only by way of an indirect, double oral assignment. 
46. The Receiver incurred additional fees responding to the untimely and 
unauthorized Supplemental Memorandum and related supplemental affidavits. 
47. At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing held October 24, 2005, this 
Court disallowed the Matthews Claim and ruled that the claim was barred as a matter of law by 
the Utah statute of frauds and applicable provisions of Utah real estate commission statutes. 
48. The actions taken by Matthews in support of the Matthews Claim were solely for 
the purpose of causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of this litigation. 
49. Matthews' improper actions in pursuing the Matthews' Claim were motivated by 
his financial desire of $100,000, as sought by the Matthews' Claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Matthews Claim was without merit and not asserted or brought in good faith. 
2. Section 78-27-56 provides: 
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(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions 
of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code § 78-27-56. 
3. "Where a party has acted on a meritless claim and in bad faith, in most cases it 
would be inequitable not to award attorney fees." Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, \ 31. 
4. A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact" Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, Tf 22. 
5. The Matthews Claim was frivolous, and certainly was of "little weight" with "no 
basis in law or fact." 
6. Governing Utah case law, as set forth in the Receiver's summary judgment 
memoranda, including Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), strictly interprets the 
relevant statutory language and specifically prohibits any real estate agent or associate broker 
including Matthews, from pursuing a commission claim against anyone other than the principal 
broker, even if the agent or associate broker claims to hold an assignment from the principal 
broker. 
7. Matthews cited no Utah case law to the contrary and incorrectly asserted that 
there was no applicable Utah case law, and failed to cite controlling Utah precedent. There is no 
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Utah case law that excuses Matthews' failure to comply with the governing statutory 
commission provisions. 
8. Matthews' arguments had no basis in fact or law, and therefore were "without 
merit" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
9. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that claims with similarly weak or non-
existent legal support are "without merit" supporting an award of legal fees under Utah Code 
Aim. § 78-27-56. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, \ 30; 
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, % 22; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998) (holding that "a finding that a party has attempted to avoid liability by testifying 
falsely will support a decision to award attorney fees if combined with a finding of bad faith"). 
10. The Utah Supreme Court has established that a party acts in "bad faith" for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, under the standard of: 
the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors 
existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the 
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
11. Matthews' lack of an honest belief in the legal basis for his claim, and his 
knowledge that his pursuit of the claim would unjustly hinder and delay the Receiver in her 
attempts to administer and close the Olympus receivership estate, is evidenced by his 
contradictory representations and admissions. 
12. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(g) provides: 
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If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay 
to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits 
caused, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
13. Whether false statements were made in Matthews' sworn statements and 
admissions that the alleged $100,000 commission was promised to him and owed to him in his 
own right for bis own efforts, or in Matthews' later sworn statements that the alleged $100,000 
commission was promised and owed to Re-Max Town & Country with his wife as principal 
broker, or in Matthews' last representations in the last-minute "Supplemental Memorandum" that 
the alleged $100,000 commission was promised and owed to Fred B. Law and then indirectly 
assigned to him, it is clear that Matthews made materially false and patently inconsistent 
statements in this proceeding, and that Matthews knew (or is charged with knowing) that those 
statements were false when he made them. 
14. Matthews' assertions are not caused by a faulty memory because they are key, 
essential, and material facts including that Matthews was never a licensed principal broker. 
15. Matthews' own discovery responses, along with the second affidavit of his wife, 
Jane Matthews, conclusively establish that Matthews knew his own affidavit on file with this 
Court contained false statements, yet neither Matthews nor his counsel withdrew or amended it. 
16. Matthews knew (or is charged with knowing) that his claim was barred by the 
statute of frauds and the Utah broker commission statutes. 
17. Matthews admitted that he was a licensed associate broker at all relevant times 
and was bound to follow the governing statutes and regulations. 
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18. Matthews submitted more that 100 pages of documents to the Receiver as support 
for his claim, but he knew that nothing in any of those documents specified a $100,000 
commission. 
19. As a licensed real estate professional, Matthews is charged with knowledge that 
an alleged oral promise of a commission is unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of 
frauds. 
20. "[A] broker must be presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for 
rendition of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
21. As a Utah-licensed real estate professional, Matthews is charged with knowledge 
that under the plain language of governing Utah broker commission statutes, he was strictly 
prohibited from pursuing a claim in his own name against Olympus for a real estate commission. 
22. In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, \ 23, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court finding of "bad faith" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because the claims 
plaintiff was asserting "had been sold by the bankruptcy trustee to Defendants in compliance 
with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court." 
23. A bad faith finding is appropriate when the "plaintiff knew of the sale and 
participated without objection in i t , . . . sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith on plaintiffs 
part." Id. 
24. In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the trial court found 
that the plaintiffs pursued their claims with "no other apparent reason than to harass . . . and/or to 
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drive up the costs of litigation/' and the Supreme Court held that the finding was enough to 
satisfy the "bad faith" element of Utah Code Ann. §. 78-27-56. 
25 Utah case law supports a conclusion in this case that the Matthews Claim was not 
asserted or pursued in good fa ith, becai ise Matthews' presi imed kn owledge of Utah law 
respecting commission agreements and commission collections, and his materially false sworn 
Si U::w\: .. / . , ' ? ? " < M \ ) ' . ; , . • ' * : " * !?iv* - i f ' 1 . ! ' '-'*>/ -\ 1 - i : " . ' } ; . : ! 1 v s . 
has pursued his claim for "no other apparent reason" than to "drive up the costs of Utigation" in 
2000 UT 102, K23.. 
I 'he actions taken by Matthews in support o i .is c ;..- m were solely for the purpose 
of causing delay and needlessly increasing the costs of this litigation. 
Each of the requirements of. k:h i *ulc Aiui. • 'O have been satisfied. 
z.6. Each of the requirements of Utah R.Civ.P. 56(g) have been satisfied. 
29. The Receiver is entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
defending against the Matthews Claim. 
DATED this day of May, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF DAVTD C. MATTHEWS was mailed first 
class and electronically emailed on this 3 day of May, 2006, to each of the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance vance@millervance.com 
2200 North Park Avenue, #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
Rick L. Knuth rknuth@joneswaldo.com 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee djlee@woodcrapo.com 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
To the Court: 
j aneth@email.utcourts.gov 
873755vl 
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ADDENDUM E 
Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief to Establish a Claim Bar Date and 
a Claim Filing Procedure; Receiver's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Declaratory Relief to Establish a Claim Bar Date and a Claim Filing 
Procedure (R. 791-835), 
Annette W, Jarvis (1649) 
Steven W. Call (5260) 
Elaine A. Monson (5523) 
RAY QUINNEY & iNEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Receiver and Attorneys for the Receiver, Annette W. Jarvis 
tf THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN RE OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION. L.C. 
RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF TO 
ESTABLISH A CLAIM BAR DATE AND 
A CLAIM FILING PROCEDURE 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
(Hearing Requested) 
The Court-appointed receiver, Annette W. Jarvis (the "Receiver'') of Olympus 
Construction. L.v" , ny and fijumjM'i \\vr counsel of R;iy ouiiniey
 t'v Ncbeker, hereby moves the 
Court for declaratory relief to establish a claim bar date and a claim filing procedure in this case. 
This rnc )tlon Is being filed pursuant t( > the laiiguage of the Stipulated Order Approving Si iccessoi 
Receiver which provides in paragraph 4 as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of known 
and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or publication, may set 
dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims all as 
i \\ 
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provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c~1305 and 1306. To the extent permitted 
by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by 
this Court in and as part of this proceeding. The Receiver may petition the Court, 
and the Court may order, expedited procedures for the adjudication and 
determination of claims, as may be appropriate and necessary for the prompt 
determination of claims. 
See Exhibit A hereto at p. 3, % 4. (Emphasis added). This motion is also supported by the 
memorandum of points and authorities and accompanying exhibits that have been filed 
concurrently herewith. 
WHEREFORE, the Receiver respectfully requests that the Court enter an order as 
follows: 
1. Approving the Notice of Deadline form which is attached to the memorandum as 
Exhibit C; 
2. Approving the proposed Notice of Claim form which is attached to the 
memorandum as Exhibit D. 
3. Establishing April 15, 2004, as the bar date for all claims to be filed against 
Olympus' receivership estate, or as soon thereafter to comply with the 120 day notice 
requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(2), and further ordering that to the extent 
creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever barred; 
4. Establishing that the Receiver be given five business days from the date of the 
entry of the Court's order establishing the claims filing procedure to send by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to all known creditors, at their last known address, both the Notice of Deadline 
and the Notice of Claim forms; 
5. Approving the Publication Notice which is attached to the memorandum as 
Exhibit E, and further ordering that the Publication Notice need only be published in both the 
Salt Lake Tribune and The Record for three successive weeks as soon as possible following the 
entry of the Court's order establishing the claims filing procedure; and 
6. Requiring that each creditor filing a claim against Olympus' receivership estate 
must either file the Notice of Claim form or a notice of claim that is substantially in the si .me 
form as the Notice of Claim, and which sets forth all of the information requested therein; and 
further requiring that all notices of claim must be executed and filed by * *K: -: • di: •- .* : 
penalty of perjury; and further requiring that all creditors be required to send a copy of their 
Notice of Claim, along with copies of all supporting documents to the Receiver, or alternatively, 
that the creditor provide the Receiver with a detailed explanation as to why such documents are 
not available; and further requiring that only the original Notice of Claim be filed with the Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District Court, and that the documents supporting the claim only be sent to 
the Receiver, along with a o - - of the Notice of Claim. 
'riie Receiver further requests that the Court set a hearing date on this Motion. 
DATED this •> ' - ' day of December, 2004. 
RAY QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
Elaine A. Monson 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Receiver's Motion 
for Declaratory Relief to Establish A Claim Bar Date and A Claim Filing Procedure was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this ,yv day of December, 2003 to the following: 
Rick Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James R. Blakesley 
2595 East 3300 South, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
Joseph E. Wrona 
1816 Prospector Avenue #100 
P.O. Box 683670 
Park City, UT 84068 
738882.01/eam 
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Annette W. Jarvis (1649) 
Steven W. Call (5260) 
Elaine A. Monson (5523) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBElvER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Receiver mil Attorney; lur the Receiver, Annette W. Jarvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COT IR Y OF S \ I I 1 MvF COLTNTY 
STATF o r U I'M I 
RECEIVER'S MEMORANDUM IN 
I SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
IN RE OLYMPUS CONSTRUCT ION, i .» . : DECLARATORY RELIEF TO 
1
 I STABLISH A CLAIM BAR DATE AND 
! A CLAIM FILING PROCEDURE 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge T\rone Medley 
The Court-appointed receiver, Annette W. Jarvis (the "Receiver") of Oh mpus 
Construction, L.C., by and through hu LUUIIMJ O\~ R iy Uuinney & Nebeker, hereby submits this 
menu n andum in support of her motion for declaratory relief to establish ,i < hum lur dale and a 
claim filing procedure in this case In uppoii heuoi, the Receiver represents as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I On or about Januai y '-< 1, 2002, a Petition for Judicial Dissolution of Olympus 
Constmction, I .<' ("Olympus") was filed in this Court. 
2. On or about March 11, 2002, an Amended Petition for Judicial Dissolution of 
Olympus was filed in this Court. 
3. On August 12, 2002, the members of Olympus entered into a Stipulation for 
Decree of Judicial Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the "Stipulation"). 
The Stipulation was executed for the purpose of dissolving the working relationship between the 
members of Olympus in an orderly manner. 
4. On August 20, 2002, based upon the Stipulation, the Court entered an Order of 
Decree of Judicial Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the "Order of 
Dissolution"). 
5. Pursuant to the Order of Dissolution, the Court appointed Alan Funk as the 
receiver of Olympus and granted him "the normal and customary powers of a receiver." 
6. Mr. Funk later submitted his resignation as the receiver of Olympus. 
7. On May 5, 2003, the Court executed a Stipulated Order Approving Successor 
Receiver (the "Stipulated Order"), pursuant to which Annette W. Jarvis was appointed as the 
successor receiver of Olympus. (Ms. Jarvis shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Receiver" and 
a copy of the Stipulated Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A). 
8. The Stipulated Order provides in paragraph 4 as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of known 
and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or publication, may set 
dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims all as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306. To the extent permitted 
by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by 
this Court in and as part of this proceeding. The Receiver may petition the Court, 
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and the Court may order, expedited procedures for the adjudication and 
determination of claims, as may be appropriate and necessary for the prompt 
determination of claims. 
See Exhibit A hereto at p. 3,1f 4. (Emphasis added). 
9. Pursuant to the Receiver's duties as set forth in this Court's Stipulated Order the 
Receiver has consulted with the members of Olympus to establish the identity and the last known 
address of all persons or entities known or reasonably expected from Olympus' past operations 
to have a claim against Olympus' receivership estate. A list of the persons and entities identified 
by the Receiver as having possible claims against Olympus' receivership estate, along with their 
last known addresses, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
10. The Receiver now seeks declaratory relief from the Court to establish a claims bar 
date and a claims filing procedure in this case. 
11. The Receiver believes that the adoption of a claims bar date and a claims filing 
procedure will promote judicial economy, ensure the lawful, fair and expeditious resolution of 
claims against Olympus' receivership estate, and will greatly facilitate the preservation of 
Olympus' receivership estate by minimizing the administrative costs relating to claims filings. 
12. Following the entry of an order establishing the claims bar and the claims filing 
procedure, the Receiver further plans to file a motion for declaratory relief to establish a claims 
adjudication process for all claims filed by the bar date. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. STANDARD FOR GRANTING DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 provides that a state court may make an order of declaratory 
relief in connection with a matter pending before it. The statute provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may 
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall 
have the force and effect of a final decree. 
Correspondingly, Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that declaratory 
relief under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 shall be brought pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See U.R.C.P. 57. Rule 57 also provides that the mere existence of another adequate 
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratoiy relief in cases where it is appropriate, and 
that the Court may order a speedy hearing on an action for declaratory judgment. Id. 
Likewise, Rule 66(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a receiver, has 
under the direction of the court, the power to generally do such acts respecting the receivership 
property as the court may authorize. 
As contemplated by paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order, the Receiver asserts that 
declaratory relief is appropriate to establish a claims bar date and a claims filing procedure 
whereby notice of the right to file a claim in this receivership proceeding will be given to all 
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potential creditors of Olympus5 receivership estate, and uniform procedures for filing a notice of 
claim will be established. 
II . THE RECEIVER'S PROPOSED CLAIMS BAR DATE AND CLAIMS FILING 
PROCEDURE 
The Receiver proposes April 15, 2004, at 4:30 p.m. (MST), or as soon thereafter to 
comply with the 120 day notice requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(2), as the 
bar date for creditors to file claims against Olympus' receivership estate and further proposes the 
following claims filing procedure: 
A. Proposed Form for Notice of Deadline for the Filing of Notice of Claim. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit C is the Receiver's proposed Notice of Deadline for the Filing 
of Notice of Claim (the "Notice of Deadline") which she proposes to send to all known persons 
or entities who may have claims against Olympus' receivership estate. The Notice of Deadline 
contains, inter alia, the following: 
(1) the bar date and time by which a Notice of Claim must be filed; 
(2) notice that Olympus was placed into receivership by this Court on August 20, 2002; 
(3) notice that the Receiver is in the process of collecting and selling the assets of 
Olympus, and that to the extent enough money is collected, distributions will be made to 
creditors; 
(4) notice that the person or entity may be a creditor of Olympus; 
(5) notice that the potential creditor can consult with their own attorney; 
(6) information regarding the Notice of Claim form which will accompany each Notice of 
Deadline mailed to known creditors; 
5 
(7) a general description of who is required to file a Notice of Claim and the definition of 
what constitutes a claim; 
(8) information regarding when and where creditors must file their Notice of Claim; 
(9) information regarding how the Notice of Claim must be signed and what documents 
should accompany the copy of the Notice of Claim which is sent to the Receiver; and 
(10) notice that failure to timely file a Notice of Claim by the bar date will forever estop 
and bar the creditor from filing a claim against Olympus' receivership estate. 
(11) notice that the filing of a claim does not necessarily mean that it will be allowed, and 
that the Receiver retains the right to review and object to all or a portion of any claim 
filed. 
The Receiver asserts that the proposed Notice of Deadline contains all of the necessary 
notices and information regarding how, when and where potential creditors must file their claims 
against Olympus' receivership estate as required by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-l 305. That statute 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) A company in winding up electing to dispose of known claims 
pursuant to this section may give written notice of the company's dissolution to 
known claimants at any time after the effective date of the dissolution. The 
written notice must: 
(a) describe the information that must be included in a claim; 
(b) provide an address to which written notice of any claim must 
be given to the company; 
(c) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days after 
the effective date of the notice, by which the dissolved company must 
receive the claim; and 
(d) state that, unless sooner barred by another state statute limiting 
actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305. 
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Therefore, the Receiver moves the Court to approve the Notice of Deadline attached 
hereto as Exhibit C. 
B. Proposed Notice of Claim Form. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit D is the Receiver's proposed Notice of Claim form which she 
proposes to enclose with the Notice of Deadline which will be mailed to all known creditors of 
Olympus' receivership estate, and which the Receiver will also provide to any potential creditors 
requesting a copy thereof. The proposed Notice of Claim form contains, inter alia, the following: 
(1) the date and time by which a Notice of Claim must be filed; 
(2) a blank space for the name and address of the creditor; 
(3) information regarding when and where a creditor must file their Notice of Claim; 
(4) a blank space for the creditor to identify the specific parcel of property to which its 
claim is related; 
(5) a blank space for the basis and description of the creditor's claim; 
(6) blank spaces to identify the date the claim was incurred and if there has been a court 
judgment against Olympus, the date it was obtained; 
(7) a blank space for the amount of the creditors claim; 
(8) a space in which the creditor can identify whether it believes its claim is secured, and 
if so, requesting information relating to the collateral securing the claim; 
(9) a blank space for the Notice of Claim to be signed by the creditor under penalty of 
perjury; 
(10) information regarding what documents should accompany the Notice of Claim; and 
(11) notice that failure to timely file a Notice of Claim by the bar date will forever estop 
and bar the creditor from filing a claim against Olympus' receivership estate. 
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The Receiver asserts that the proposed Notice of Claim form contains all of the necessary 
information which will allow potential creditors to set forth the amount and basis for their claims 
against Olympus' receivership estate, as well as notices regarding how, when and where 
potential creditors must file their claims. Therefore, the Receiver moves the Court to approve 
the proposed Notice of Claim form attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
C. Proposed Bar Date for All Claims Filings. 
The Receiver proposes April 15, 2004, at 4:30 p.m. (MST), or as soon thereafter to 
comply with the 120 day notice requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(2), as the 
bar date for creditors to file claims in Olympus' receivership estate. This deadline complies with 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(2)(c) which states that the bar date for companies in the winding 
up process should not be fewer than 120 days after the effective date of the notice of the right to 
file a claim. This deadline will allow all potential creditors more than sufficient time to review 
their records and determine whether they have legitimate claims that should be filed against 
Olympus's receivership estate. 
In addition, the Notice of Deadline and the Notice of Claim forms both contain language 
that if a claim is not timely filed by the bar date, then a creditor will be forever stopped and 
barred from filing a claim against Olympus' receivership estate. 
The Receiver moves the Court to approve April 15, 2004, at 4:30 p.m. (MST) or as soon 
thereafter to comply with the 120 day notice requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1305(2), as the bar date for all creditor claims to be filed against Olympus' receivership estate, 
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and further ordering that to the extent creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever 
barred. 
D. Known Creditors to Whom the Notice of Deadline and Accompanying Notice 
of Claim Must Be Sent By the Receiver. 
One of the tasks undertaken by the Receiver since her appointment is to identify all 
persons or entities who may have claims against Olympus' receivership estate so that notice can 
be provided to them of their right to file a claim. Accordingly, the Receiver has consulted with 
the members of Olympus to establish the identity and the last known address of all persons or 
entities known or reasonably expected from Olympus' past operations to have a claim against 
Olympus5 receivership estate. A list of those persons and entities identified by the Receiver as 
potential creditors is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The Receiver moves that she be given five business days from the date of the entry of the 
Court order establishing the claims filing procedure to send by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
to all known creditors, at their last known address, both the Notice of Deadline and the Notice of 
Claim forms. 
E. Notice By Publication to Unknown Creditors. 
Notwithstanding the Receiver's attempt to identify all potential creditors of Olympus' 
receivership estate, the Receiver is cognizant that there may be some creditors whose identities 
either cannot be ascertained from her investigation of potential claims, or are unknown for some 
other reason. Accordingly, the Receiver moves the Court that she be allowed to publish notice of 
Olympus' dissolution in newspapers of general circulation in Utah pursuant to which notice will 
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be provided that all persons with claims against Olympus' receivership estate must present them 
by the bar date and in accordance with the notice as contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1306. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) A dissolved company in winding up may publish notice of its 
dissolution and request that persons with claims against the company present 
them in accordance with the notice. 
(2) The notice contemplated under Subsection (1) must: 
(a) be published once a week for three successive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the dissolved 
company's designated office, or, if it has not designated office in this 
state, its registered office, is or was last located; 
(b) describe the information that must be included in a claims and 
provide an address to which written notice of any claim must be given to 
the company; 
(c) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days after 
the first date of publication of the notice; by which the dissolved company 
must receive the claim; and 
(d) state that, unless sooner barred by another statute limiting 
actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit E is the proposed Notice of Deadline for the Filing of Notice 
of Claim Against Olympus Construction, L.C. (the "Publication Notice") that the Receiver 
proposes to publish in both the Salt Lake Tribune and the The Record for three successive weeks 
as soon as possible following the entry of the Court's order establishing a claims filing 
procedure. 
The Publication Notice is similar to the Notice of Deadline, and contains essentially the 
same information contained in the Notice of Deadline, as more particularly described in Section 
II. A above, except that the Publication Notice contains information that the creditor can obtain a 
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Notice of Claim form from the Receiver or alternatively explains what information must be 
contained in any notice of claim filed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court in 
Olympus' receivership case. 
The Receiver asserts that the proposed Publication Notice contains all of the necessary 
notices and information regarding how, when and where potential creditors must file their claims 
against Olympus' receivership estate as required by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1306. 
Therefore, the Receiver moves the Court to approve the Publication Notice attached 
hereto as Exhibit E, and further moves that the Publication Notice must only be published in the 
Salt Lake Tribune and The Record for three successive weeks as soon as possible following the 
entry of the Court's order establishing a claims filing procedure. 
F. What Must be Filed by Each Creditor and How Notice of Claim Must be 
Executed. 
The Receiver contends that Olympus' receivership estate would be greatly benefited if 
there is uniformity in the notice of claims that are filed. This will assist the Receiver in 
analyzing claims, help eliminate frivolous claims, and reduce the administrative costs and 
expenses to the estate with respect to the adjudication of claims. 
Accordingly, the Receiver moves the Court to require that each creditor filing a claim 
against Olympus' receivership estate must either file the Notice of Claim form or a notice of 
claim that is substantially in the same form as the Notice of Claim, and which sets forth all of the 
information requested therein. 
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The Receiver further moves the Court that all notices of claim must be executed by the 
creditor and filed under penalty of perjury. 
Finally, the Receiver further moves that all creditors be required to send a copy of their 
Notice of Claim, along with copies of all supporting documents sufficient to the Receiver. The 
supporting documents will enable to Receiver to evaluate the claims and determine whether they 
should be allowed or objected to. If supporting documents are not available, then the Receiver 
moves that the creditor be required to provide the Receiver with a detailed explanation as to why 
such documents are not available. 
In addition, to reduce the amount of documents that are filed with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Receiver further moves the Court to require that only the original 
Notice of Claim be filed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, and that the 
documents supporting the claim be sent only to the Receiver, along with a copy of the Notice of 
Claim. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Receiver respectfully requests that the Court enter an order as 
follows: 
1. Approving the Notice of Deadline form attached hereto as Exhibit C; 
2. Approving the proposed Notice of Claim form attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
3. Establishing April 15,2004, at 4:30 p.m. (MST), or as soon thereafter to comply 
with the 120 day notice requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-l 305(2), as the bar date 
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for all claims to be filed against Olympus' receivership estate, and further ordering that to the 
extent creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever barred; 
4. Establishing that the Receiver be given five business days from the date of the 
entry of the Court's order establishing the claims filing procedure to send by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to all known creditors, at their last known address, both the Notice of Deadline 
and the Notice of Claim forms; 
5. Approving the Publication Notice attached hereto as Exhibit E, and further 
ordering that the Publication Notice need only be published in both the Salt Lake Tribune and 
The Record for three successive weeks as soon as possible following the entry of the Court's 
order establishing the claims filing procedure; and 
6. Requiring that each creditor filing a claim against Olympus' receivership estate 
must either file the Notice of Claim form or a notice of claim that is substantially in the same 
form as the Notice of Claim, and which sets forth all of the information requested therein; and 
further requiring that all notices of claim must be executed and filed by the creditor under 
penalty of perjury; and further requiring that all creditors be required to send a copy of their 
Notice of Claim, along with copies of all supporting documents to the Receiver, or alternatively, 
that the creditor provide the Receiver with a detailed explanation as to why such documents are 
not available; and further requiring that only the original Notice of Claim be filed with the Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District Court, and that the documents supporting the claim must only be 
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sent to the Receiver, along with a copy of the Notice of Claim. 
DATED this 2 ~ day of December, 2004. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
r
 n-f ^ v V ^ 
Elaine A. Monson 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Receiver's 
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Declaratory Relief to Establish A Claim Bar Date and A 
Claim Filing Procedure was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ^L day of December, 2003 to 
the following: 
Rick Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James R- Blakesley 
2595 East 3300 South, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
Joseph E. Wrona 
1816 Prospector Avenue # 100 
P.O. Box 683670 
Park City, UT 84068 
/ 
/ s - / , 
/ - / / / 
731228.01/earn 
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ADDENDUM F 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, § 807 (1996); Model Business 
Corporations Act, § 14.06 (3rd ed. 2002) 
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (1996) 
Section 807. Known Claims Against Dissolved Limited Liability Company. 
(a) A dissolved limited liability company may dispose of the known claims 
against it by following the procedure described in this section. 
(b) A dissolved limited liability company shall notify its known claimants in 
writing of the dissolution. The notice must: 
(1) specify the information required to be included in a claim; 
(2) provide a mailing address where the claim is to be sent; 
(3) state the deadline for receipt of the claim, which may not be less 
than 120 days after the date the written notice is received by the claimant; and 
(4) state that the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline. 
(c) A claim against a dissolved limited liability company is barred if the 
requirements of subsection (b) are met, and: 
(1) the claim is not received by the specified deadline; or 
(2) in the case of a claim that is timely received but rejected by the 
dissolved company, the claimant does not commence a proceeding to enforce the 
claim within 90 days after the receipt of the notice of the rejection. 
(d) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a contingent 
liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date of 
dissolution. 
{Model Business Corporation Act provision on following page} 
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
3rd Edition (Rev. through 2002) 
§ 14.06. Known Claims Against Dissolved Corporation. 
(a) A dissolved corporation may dispose of known claims against it by 
notifying its known claimants in writing of the dissolution at any time after its 
effective date. 
(b) The written notice must: 
(1) describe information that must be included in a claim; 
(2) provide a mailing address where a claim may be sent; 
(3) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days from the 
effective date of the written notice, by which the dissolved corporation must receive 
the claim; and 
(4) state that the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline. 
(c) A claim against a dissolved corporation is barred: 
(1) if a claimant who was given written notice under subsection (b) 
does not deliver the claim to the dissolved corporation by the deadline; or 
(2) if a claimant whose claim was rejected by the dissolved 
corporation does not commence a proceeding to enforce the claim within 90 days 
from the effective date of the rejection notice. 
(d) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a contingent 
liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date of 
dissolution. 
